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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical literature provides straightforward answers to 
questions of the general form: what are the long-run effects on in-
flation at home and abroad of a sustained increase in monetary growth 
at home? It is less informative, however, about questions of the kind: 
what are the long-run effects on monetary growth and inflation at home 
and abroad of a sustained increase in the gap between public purchases 
of home output and net explicit taxes on home incomes? 
Building on the work of Cagan (1956), Christ (1968), Turnovsky 
(1977) and others, this dissertation addresses the latter type of 
question. Various other short-run and long-run effects of expansionary 
public policy are also considered. Finally, stability, and (less 
frequently) existence and uniqueness properties are investigated. 
For these purposes, a static Keynes-Phillips model is embedded 
in a dynamic model of the creation of public debt, the formation of 
CPI and exchange-rate expectations, and movements in the terms of trade; 
the main analytical novelty being full accounting for the effects of 
inflation, interest and growth on the budget constraints of the public 
and private sectors. 
Note, however, that the foregoing static and dynamic elements 
are invoked selectively, depending on considerations of simplicity, 
the particular problem at hand, and the relevant time horizon (cf. 
Henderson (1977)). The notion of a hierarchy of successively longer 
time spans is the central organizing principle of the analysis. Four 
different time horizons are considered o 
In the shortest run, investigated in Chapters III and IV, real 
intensive output is predetermined. Results in this setting include a 
variable-inflation analogue of the Dornbusch (1976c) result on exchange-
rate overshoot. 
Over the next horizon, output is demand-determined and inflation 
expectations are predetermined. One exercise suggested by this frame-
work is a synthesis of repercussion-multiplier and Phillips-Curve 
notions; see Chapter IV. 
In the longer-run analyses, output is fixed at capacity and 
expectations are realized. An "inter-run" variant assumes further 
that national public sectors are able to hold down nominal rates of 
interest, and/or that external accounts are in a state of "quasi 
equilibrium" (cf. Mundell (1968)). It is then shown, for example, 
that the effect on a small country's disposable income of an increase 
In public spending on the home good is glven by the inverse of the 
standard Marshall-Lerner expression; see Chapters II and III. 
In the longest run, nominal rates of interest fully reflect 
the Fisher effect, and external accounts are in full equilibrium. It 
is shown that over such a time span, the implementation of a constant 
monetary growth rule would have to be accompanied by an "accommodating" 
fiscal policy; see Chapter IV. 
On the other hand, suppose that monetary growth is endogenous 
In every country, and reconsider the problem posed at the outset. Then: 
(1) the domestic and foreign inflationary effects of an increased 
budget deficit at home are independent of relative economic size; 
(2) either in a "reserve-currency" country, or in any country under 
flexible rates, the disturbance in question will induce a more than 
proportional increase in domestic monetary growth; (3) rates of monetary 
growth abroad will rise pari passu or remain unchanged according as 
whether the domestic economy is a reserve-currency country or under 
flexible rates; (4) higher budget deficits in "peripheraV' countries 
will not affect monetary growth anywhere. 
These and other fiscal analogues of more-familiar propositions 
concerning the international transmission of monetary disturbances 
are established in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER I 
INFLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN A CLOSED ECONOMY 
1. INTRODUCTION: TWO POPULAR EXPLANATIONS OF INFLATION 
Students of inflation have now reached a measure of consensus. 
Most would agree that the Phillips curve--augmented by variables for 
anticipated domestic and foreign inflation, and possibly reinterpreted 
as an aggregate supply curve--is the best available proximate explana-
tion of short-run national inflation rates. Most would accept that 
this curve is approximately vertical in the long run. And most would 
also accept various long-run equilibrium relationships, such as the 
purchasing power parity theory (at least in its 'relative' version), 
the proposition that expectations of inflation and other variables are 
realized (at least in an expected-value sense), and the proposition 
that rates of inflation wil~ equal nominal monetary growth less real 
output growth (at least in the absence of productivity growth)o Finally, 
most analysts would probably agree that the main cause of postwar [n-
flation has been some kind of sustained public-sector disturbance. 
But the last-mentioned area of agreement--which, for reasons 
which will soon become apparent, has been deliberately left vague--is 
also intimately related to a major area of dispute: to understand the 
behaviour of the public sector, should we view the fiscal authorities 
as the 'initiating' agency, with the monetary authorities playing an 
Itacconnnodatingtl or tlpassive tl role--or is the opposite perspective more 
correct? 
Parkin (1976) forcefully states the essentials of the former 
point of view: 
1 
2 
" .. ovote-seeking politicians believe (rightly or 
wrongly) that by increasing government expenditure 
on social programs, subsidies and the like, and by 
holding down interest rates they can improve their 
electoral chanceso The result is an excessive rate 
of money creation to pay for the programs. 111 
And in the long run, of course, inflation will rise more or less pari 
passu. Parkin made the foregoing observations on postwar British ex-
perienceo No doubt there are close substitutes in the economic com-
mentary on most other industrial democracies. On this view, the ob-
jective of the monetary authorities is the passive one of attempting 
to maintain 'cheap money' in the face of increased public-sector 
deficits. The time horizon under consideration may permit a squeezing 
of the real rate of return on government debt. 
More formally, the short-run (economic) aspects of Parkin's 
scenario are easily handled by the standard Keynes-Phillips apparatus, 
whereas the pioneering investigations into the associated long-run as-
pects are Christ (1968), (1969). These papers also consider the secular 
effects of higher public spending and/or lower net explicit taxes in 
conditions of endogenously-supplied money. However, they restrict atten-
tion to the case of a closed economy characterized by stationary secular 
nominal income and by net explicit taxes which are at least partly 
raised by a proportional impost on factor incomes. 
From these considerations, and also by abstracting from interest 
payments, Christ deduced a simple result. Let G = nominal public spend-
ing, T = nominal net lump-sum taxes, D = G-T = public sector's 'legislated' 
deficit, Y = nominal gross factor income, and u = rate of tax on factor 
incomes. Denote the pegged states and steady states of variables by a 
bar and an asterisk respectively. Then D-uY*=O, which yields dY*/dD=l/~. 
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Or, as Christ (1968) puts it, "long-run static equilibrium requires a 
balanced budget. It is this feature of the analysis which yields a 
long-run government purchases [and transfers] multiplier of l/u when 
tax rates are fixed" (po 66, loco cit.). 
Christ's 1968 paper postulated a fixed price level, so that 
the above result was interpreted as applying to real output. More 
pertinent to our subsequent analysis is his 1969 paper, which postu-
lates fixed real output; then the price level becomes the critical 
endogenous variable. His overall tbudgetaryt approach has stimulated 
a prodigious amount of research. 2 One consequence of this has been 
the discovery of many alternative specifications of 'accommodating' or 
'passive' central-bank reactions. We shall find it convenient for 
the subsequent open-economy analysis, however, to focus upon the above-
mentioned case of pegged nominal rates of return on interest-bearing 
public debt. 
In contrast to this budgetary approach there is the classical 
monetary perspective, whereby nominal monetary growth is exogenous in 
at least one country, and the real rate of interest is exogenous every-
where--see, e.g., Whitman (1975), Swoboda (1977). This entails 
endogenous rates of government spending and/or net explicit taxes . For 
example, it is often explicitly or implicitly assumed that increases 
in the nominal money supply are rebated to the private sector in a 
lump-sum fashion. That assumption is explicit in Friedman (1969) and 
the money-in-growth models. 
In the special case of a closed economy characterized by no 
productivity growth (and the latter is also typically assumed by the 
budgetary analyses), the basic comparative-statics proposition of the 
4 
monetary approach is even more simple and well-known than its budget-
ary counterpart. Let ~ = rate of nominal monetary growth, p = actual 
rate of inflation, and n = exogenously-given rate of population and 
- -
real output growtho Then ~ - p* - n = 0, which yields dp*/d~ = 10 
Or, since long-run static equilibrium requires stationary real per 
capita balances, a 1 percent increase in nominal monetary growth will 
raise inflation by 1 percento 
In summary, we can distinguish two popular explanations of the 
link between public-sector disturbances and accelerated inflationo 
Each can be summarized by a simple comparative-statics proposition. 
The question of which explanation is more correct can only be settled 
empiricallyo 
Nevertheless, joint consideration of these explanations draws 
attention to other interesting and unsettled questions. Noting that 
the monetary approach explicitly deals with sustained inflation (and 
inflation taxes), is there a simple variable-inflation analogue of 
the basic comparative-statics proposition of the budgetary approach? 
And noting the explicit, indeed critical role of the public sector 
constraint in the budgetary approach, how does that constraint fit 
into the monetary approach? What are the principal effects of our two 
public-sector disturbances apart from higher inflation? Finally, 
much is known about stability in the case of endogenous inflation an-
ticipations under fixed real interest and nominal monetary growth 
rates. But this is not so in the case of endogenous inflation antici-
pations and endogenous nominal monetary growth under a fixed nominal 
interest rate. 
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This chapter addresses these equestions in the context of a 
simple model of a closed economy 0 That model also underlies an open-
economy analysis in later chapters. Its main analytical novelty is 
full accounting for the effects of inflation, interest and growth on 
the budget constraints of the public and private sectorso Section 2 
exposits the modelo Section 3 considers the short runo Section 4 
considers the long runo Section 5 examines the stability of the 
alternative policy regimes. Section 6 contains a summary. 
6 
20 THE MODEL 
The exposition proceeds as follows. First the main assumptions 
are listed and discussedo Next the instantaneous relationships are 
laid outo Then those relationships are embedded in a dynamic model 
of asset accumulation (or decumulation), and the formation of inflation-
ary expectations 0 Finally, the model is closed by imposing one or the 
other of the budgetary and monetary regimes, and initial conditions 
are introduced. 
Assumptions 
10 Net explicit taxes are lump-sum imposts and transfers 0 
2. The public sector does not rebate its revenues from debt cre-
ation to the private sector in proportion to initial holdings 
of public debt. 
3. The only assets held by the private sector are those created 
by the public sector, viz., base money, and a variable-interest 
short-term 'bond' (like a savings-account deposit). 
40 Labour is the sole factor of production, is in infinitely 
elastic supply at each point in time, and grows at a constant 
rate. There are constant returns to scale, so that physical 
capacity output grows at the same rate as the labour stocko 
The gap between actual and capacity real per capita output is 
proportional to the gap between actual and anticipated infla-
tion. 
5. There is perfect myopic foresight of all variables except pos-
sibly interest and inflation rates (whose anticipations are 
modelled in different ways). Public- and private-sector 
7 
consumption plans are fulfilled at each point in time. 
60 Private aggregate demand for goods and services (ioe., pri-
vate absorption) is an increasing function of anticipated 
private disposable income and actual wealth, and a decreasing 
function of the anticipated real interest rateo The private 
sector perceives its holdings of interest-bearing public 
debt to be part of its wealth (at least in a proximate sense; 
see below). Private demand for base money is an increasing 
function of output and a decreasing function of the nominal 
interest rate. 
7. All variables adjust 'smoothly' in the sense of being differ-
entiable with respect to the time except possibly when shift 
parameters are altered (see below). 
8. In the absence of explicit statements to the contrary, we 
focus on "mild" inflations, by which we mean small perturb-
ations about initial states wherein either monetary growth is 
zero (i.e., conforms to the full-liquidity rule), or public 
spending equals net explicit taxes. It turns out that these 
alternative initial states are equivalent in the steady state, 
providing real rates of interest initially conform to the 
golden rule. 
These assumptions warrant further comment. Assumption 1 admits 
various easily-manageable extensions. For example, and in marked con-
trast to Christ (1968, 1969), it would make little difference to the 
present analysis if explicit taxes were partly raised by a proportional 
impost on gross factor incomes. Assumption 2 intentionally introduces 
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a critical non-neutrality element; see eog., Mundell (1971, Cho2.) 
It is also a standard assumption concerning public-sector behaviour 0 
Assumption 3 can be modified by postulating that the bond is a per-
petuity rather than one which is traded at fixed par values; the 
only difference is that the stability analysis becomes more compli-
catedo For further discussion of this point see, eogo, Tobin and 
Buiter (1976)0 Assumption 4 reveals that we are abstracting from 
productivity growth. This, too, is a fairly standard assumptiono 
Considering Assumptions 3 and 4 together, it is apparent that we are 
abstracting from physical capital and the financial claims associ-
ated with it. This is for simplicity, and is especially useful in 
the subsequent open-economy chapters. Assumption 5 represents a 
compromise, in the context of a consistent model, between simplicity 
and the inclusion of output and employment transients; for further 
discussion of these issues, see Turnovsky (1977, especially Ch. 3). 
With regard to Assumption 6, the absence of durable goods in 
the model implies that the anticipated real interest rate in private 
aggregate demand should be interpreted as reflecting substitution 
between spending and savings rather than physical capital accurnula-
tiono For evidence that such effects take place, see, eogo, Weber 
(1970). On the question of whether government bonds are part of 
private net worth, note that our formulation of the private sector's 
flow budget constraint will be shown to imply that the private sec-
tor does correctly take into aC(l)unt its ureal" tax liabilities, if 
only in a long-run average sense. For further discussion of this 
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approach, see, eogo, Dornbusch (1977) (especially no 2)0 Finally, 
one can incorporate the anticipated inflation rate and the real per 
capita wealth stock into the private expenditure and money demand 
functions respectively, without fundamentally changing the main 
resultso 
Assumption 7, which is fairly standard in the literature, is 
amplified and discussed belowo Finally, we mostly resort to 
Assumption 8 when analyzing transients. In this context it is used 
to eliminate certain income effects which would complicate the ana-
lysis without fundamentally changing the main results, given conven-
tional assumptions concerning gross substitutability. On the full 
liquidity rule, see Friedman (1969). The golden rule is used here in 
a way similar to that of Mathieson (1976). 
10 
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Instantaneous Relationships 
Equations (101) set out standard market-clearing a s s umptions 
and a definition of the 2legislated deficit': 
-Q = Z +G q = z +g , 
C - L , c - t 
D 
-
G - T , 5 - g - t 
where q - Q/PN = real per capita supply of output, 
z - Z/PN = real per capita private demand for output, 
g - G/PN = real per capital public demand for output, always 
taken to be pegged, 
c - C/PN = real per capita supply of base money (or ,monetized 
public debt), 
~ - L/PN - real per capita private demand for base money , 
6 - D/PN - real per capita legislated deficit, 
t - T/PN - real per capita net explicit taxes, 
P, N = price of output and level of the labour force re-
spectively. 
Equations (1.2) describe aggregate private demand for goods a nd 
money, and the aggregate supply of goods: 
where 
z = z + (l-s)y - t p + ww 
t - kq¢ exp[- a (p+rr)] 
p - y(q-qF) + TT 
z - autonomous private expenditure, a constant , 
s = marginal propensity to save, a cons tant , 
(1 . 2a ) f 
(1 . 2b) f 
y = anticipated real per capita private disposable income 
(see below), 
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~ = responsiveness of anticipated savings with respect to the 
interest rate, a constant, 
p - r-TI = anticipated real rate of interest, 
w = responsiveness of spending with respect to wealth, a con-
stant, 
w 
- w/PN = real per capita private aggregate holdings of 
public debt, 
k = inverse of the output ('income') velocity of circulation 
in the initial state (see below), a constant, 
¢ = output ('income' ) elasticity of money demand, a constant, 
ex(p+rr ) = interest elasticity of money demand, where ex is constant, 
TT = anticipated rate of inflation, 
• 
p 
-
PIP = actual rate of inflation, 
y = responsiveness of actual inflation with respect to excess 
demand, a constant, 
q = real per capita 'full employment' output, a constant. F 
All the constants are positive except possibly z, whose precise 
value is not important here. On the empirical considerations under-
lying our semilogarithmic specification of money demand, see Section 5 
of Chapter 3. 
Finally, the respective nominal and real per capita counter-
parts of our definition of real per capita private disposable income 
are 
Y = Q - T + rCW-C) , y = q - t + p(w-c) - TIC - nw (1.3),(1.3)' 
where Y = nominal private disposable income; and y = anticipated real 
per capita private income = gross factor earnings q, less net explicit 
taxes t, plus anticipated earnings from holdings of interest-bearing 
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public debt p (w-c), less the anticipated inflation tax on monetized 
public debt TIC, less the growth tax on aggregate public debt nw 
• 
(n = N/N), all in real per capita terms. 
This formulation reflects our (institutional) Assumption 2: 
to provide for the anticipated inflation and igrawth i depreciation 
of its real per capita public debt holdings, the private sector is 
continually obliged to set aside TIC and nw respectively of its in-
come in real per capita terms. And as a consequence of Assumption 
5--in particular, the possible imperfect myopic foresight of infla-
tion--we distinguish between anticipated and actual real per capita 
private disposable income, with the former being relevant to private-
sector decisions, and the latter being given by q-t + (r-p)(w-c)-pc-nw. 
The difference between these variables is therefore (TI-p)w; this vari-
able equals unanticipated private savings, and plays a role in the 
model analogous to that of unanticipated inventory investment in the 
traditional model (see Kingston and Turnovsky (1978) for further dis-
cussion of this point). 
Dynamic Relationships 
The model contains two dynamic relationships unless the policy 
regime under consideration involves pegging the rate of nominal mone-
tary growth. In that case we require a third differential equation; 
see the next subsection. 
Consider first the public-sector constraint in nominal and real 
per capita terms respectively: 
o 
W = D + r(W-C) , • w = 0 + (r-p)(w-c) - pc - nw (lo4a),(lo4a)r 
Equation (1.4a) states that in nominal terms, the public sector fi-
nances its legislated deficit and interest obligations by issuing or 
13 
retiring debto Equation (1.4a)' reveals that in real per capita 
terms the actual inflation tax on monetized debt, pc, and the , 
growth tax on aggregate public debt, nw, raise revenue for the pub-
lic sector. 
Consider next the formation of inflation expectations : 
TI = ~(p-IT) 
where ~ = speed of expectations adjustment, a constant, ~ > o. 
Despite the recent literature on rational expectations (see, e.g., 
Schiller (1978», this simple adaptive specification can still be 
justified. In particular, there are the theoretical arguments of 
Friedman (1975), based on information costs; and the empirical studies 
by Turnovsky (1970), Pesando (1975), Feige and Pearce (1977) and 
Carlson (1977), which provide evidence for autoreggressively-generated 
inflation expectations. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
these considerations are not strictly relevant here, since our model 
does not explicitly handle information costs or the general problem of 
uncertainty. Thus, for example, there is no stochastic variation of 
public policies in our model, and it might be argued that such consider-
ations provide the main justification of autoregressive specifications 
of inflation expectations. Accordingly, we shall also pay attention 
to the limiting case of perfect myopic foresight of the inflation 
rate--in symbols, ~ - 00. Note, too, that our treatment of exchange rate 
expectations is altogether different; see Chapter III. 
As a final point concerning these dynamic relationships, we must 
strengthen Assumption 7. In particular, assume W, P and IT adjust 
'sluggishly' in the sense of being everywhere continuous with respect 
to time (providing ~ < 00). Since Assumption 4 implies that N is also 
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everywhere continuous with respect to time, it follows that w(= W/PN) 
has the same propertyo Clearly this assumption is necessary if (lo4a)i 
and (lo4b)i are to be well defined under parameter shiftso It is cer-
tainly not economically justifiable under all conceivable parameter 
shifts. For example, we would expect a sales tax increase to induce a 
step increast in P, at least in the first instanceo But it seems not 
unreasonable for the parameter shifts under consideration here, namely, 
11 h . tad It. We now turn to a more detailed discussion sma c anges ln g, , n ~. 
of those parameters, in which context we also introduce a final dynamic 
relationship. 
Public Policy 
The 'budgetary' and 'monetaryf regimes were discussed in 
Section 1. In symbols the former is given by 
t = t , P + TI - r • (lo5a)',(1.5b)' 
Equations (101)' to (1.5)' together determine the endogenous vari-
abIes q, c, p, and y; the predetermined variables w, TI, and p; and 
the pegged variables g, t, and r. Note .that (l.lc)' and (l.Sa)' 
together imply that the legislated deficit 5 is effectively 
pegged. 
The 'monetary' regime is given by 
. -
c = c(~-p-n), p = p • (1.6a)',(1.6b)f 
Equation (lo6a)t utilizes the identity c - c(~-p-n), which is well 
defined only if c adjusts sluggishly. But that assumption would 
appear reas onable in the present case. Strictly speaking, Cl. 6b)' 
should be interpreted as embodying the policy assumption of indexed 
interest-bearing public debt rather than (say) the market assumption 
of arbitrage between bonds and claims to durable goods. Equations 
(1.1)' to (1.4)', together with (1.6)', determine the endogenous 
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variables q, p, y, and t; the predetermined variables w, 0, and c; 
and the pegged variables g, ~, and po Now the legislated deficit 0 
is endogenous. For a summary of the model under each policy regime, 
see Section 50 
Finally, let us transpose Assumption 8 into symbols: 
II. = 0 0 = 0 p - n = 0 t = k ~o '0 '0 ' 0 
where the subscript 0 denotes initial valueso Under (1.7e)', and in 
the steady state, the initial state described by (lo7a)' is equivalent 
to that described by (1.7b)'. Hence one of (1.7a)' and (lo7b)' is re-
dundanto Similarly, we could replace (107a)' or (l.7b)' by one or the 
other of 
rr+n=O p +n=O 
o '0 
and shall do so as is convenient. Turning to (107d)', that condition 
merely represents a particular choice of units. As a consequence of 
the other initial conditions and (102b)', it is equivalent to 
q = 1 0 
o 
30 THE SHORT RUN 
This section considers some impact effects of expansionary 
policy under the two alternative regimes. We assume the initial state 
is the steady state together with conditions (1.7)'. 
The Budgetary Regime 
Equations (l.la)', (1.2a)', (1.3)', (loS)' and (1.7)' together 
yield the familiar result 
1 
-dg s 
(10 8a) r = -
In other words, a unit increase in real per capita public spending will 
raise real per capita output by the inverse of the marginal propensity 
to save. Under a pegged interest rate and the initial conditions 
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specifying a tmild' inflation, the money-market parameters are 
irrelevant 0 The only thing that matters is the elementary multiplier 
process. 
Similarly, we deduce 
~ =:i. dc = ~ iY = 1 0 
s 'dg s' dg -dg s 
An increase in real per capita public spending will also raise actual 
inflation, the real per capita supply of high-powered money, and anti-
cipated real per capita private disposable income. The latter variable 
rises by the same amount as output 0 Another familiar result (not shown) 
is that a unitary public spending increase is more expansionary than a 
unit tax reduction, so that a tax-financed increase in public spending 
will have a net expansionary effecto In summary, the main point is 
that the goods market clears instantaneously via a rise in output 
supported by an accommodating increase in the money supply. 
The Monetary Regime 
First, a preliminary. Since the real per capita base money 
stock is predetermined under a pegged rate of nominal monetary growth, 
and noting that the instantaneous relationships are independent of the 
rate of nominal monetary growth, it follows that the impact effects of 
a finite increase in nominal monetary growth on the levels of the in-
stantaneous variables are all zero. Instead, the disturbance in ques-
tion will affect the rate of change of the instantaneous variables, 
operating through the rate of change of the real per capita money sup-
ply (see (l.6a)t). 
For example, consider real per capita output. Insert (l.2b)t 
into (l.lb)t, take logs, differentiate with respect to time, and recall 
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(1.6)', which yields 
d (g[g) 1 
- -
¢ • 
(lo9a) If 
-
d ~ 
A 1 percent increase in the rate of nominal monetary growth will 
raise the percentage rate of growth of real per capita output growth 
by the inverse of the output elasticity of money demando Under a 
pegged real interest rate the goods-market parameters are irrelevant. 
All that matters is the elementary 'income-velocity' processo 
This result, (1.2c)l, (lola)', (lo2a)', (103)1 and (107)' to-
gether yield 
• • iE. y dt -s ~ 1 
= = - • 
- ¢ , - (l-s )¢ , (l-s )¢ d~ d~ d~ 
(1. 9b ) , ,(1. 9c )', (10 9d )' 
An increase in nominal monetary growth will raise the absolute rate 
of change of the actual inflation rate, real per capita net explicit 
transfers, and anticipated real per capita private disposable income. 4 
The absolute rate of change of the latter variable rises by more than 
the absolute rate of change of output, as a consequence of the in-
duced decrease (increase) in the absolute rate of change in net ex-
plicit taxes (transfers). These results are 'dual' to those obtained 
for the effects of expansionary policy under the budgetary regime: 
the proximate determinant of output response is the money market rather 
that the goods market, and the accommodating variable is the absolute 
rate of change of net explicit taxes rather than the money stocko 
4. THE LONG RUN 
The long run is defined by the state of the system when sta-
tionarity conditions are imposed on the dynamic equatiollSo Now there 
are no predetermined variables. First we consider some long-run 
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properties of the model which are valid for any policy regime. Next 
we consider expansionary policy under the budgetary regime and the 
monetary regime respectively. 
Long-Run Equilibrium Relationships 
In the first place, from the stationarity condition to (lo4b)t 
we obtain 
TT* = p* • 
Inflation expectations are realized in the long run. 
Second, (1.2c)' and (loIOa)t together yield 
q* = q • F 
(I. lOa) t 
(l.lOb)' 
Output is fixed at 'capacity'. With labour the sole factor of produc-
tion, this is a version of the 'natural-rate hypothesis'. 
Third, from (l.lOa)'and the requirement that long-run real per 
capita money balances be stationary, it follows that 
~* = TT* + n , (l.lOc) t 
a proposition which requires no further comment. 
Fourth, from (l.lOa)' and the stationarity condition to (1.4a)f 
we obtain 
6 * + P * (w*- C -k) - TT*C * - nw* = a . (l.lOd) t 
If public purchases and interest obligations are not covered by net 
explicit taxes, then revenues from the inflation-cumrgrowth tax must 
make up the difference. From this equation, too, follows the equiva-
lence of (1.7 a)' and (1. 7b) , , given (1. 7 c)', (1.1 Oa) f and (1.1 Oc) r. 
Fifth, from (l.lOa)', (l.lOb)', (lolOc1)', (lolOc)', and (1 0 3)' 
we deduce 
Y .J· _ q g ro.  - • F (l.lOe)' 
This is one of the most interesting implications of Droper accounting 
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for the effects of inflation, interest and growth rates in budget con-
straints: in the long run, private disposable income is given by 
gross factor income less public spending--not by gross factor in-
come less net explicit taxes. Indeed, steady-state private disposable 
income is completely independent of net explicit taxes. 
Finally, from (l.lOe)' and (lola)' we deduce 
y* = z* . (lolOf)' 
Income equals spending in the steady state. This is a familiar impli-
cation of simple thoarding' models. 
As a direct consequence of the foregoing results we have 
dy* = dz* 
= - 1 • 
- -dg dg 
In other words, an increase in real per capita public spending will 
eventually crowd out an equal amount of real per capita private spending 
and income. In addition to holding under either policy regime, these 
results do not require Assumptions 6 and 7. On the other hand, we do re-
quire the assumption of a 'mild' inflation--more on this in Chapter IV. 
The Budgetary Regime 
What are the long-run inflationary effects of expansionary 
policy under the budgetary regime? Apply the policy assumptions (1 . 5)' 
and the initial conditions (1.7)' to the budget-balance condition 
(l.lOd)', to obtain 
dTI* 1 (lol2a)t = - • 
-do w* 
In other words, a unit increase in the real per capita legislated 
deficit will raise the steady-state rate of inflation by the inverse of 
the real per capita stock of aggregate public debt. 
20 
This is evidently a variable-inflation tdual t of Christ's early 
result (see Section 1). Specifically, the income-tax rate, u, has 
been supplanted by the relevant inflation-tax base, Wo That base is 
the stock of aggregate public debt--not the real stock of monetized 
public debt, which is the focus of the traditional theory of the in-
flation tax. The point is simply that the inflation-tax base avail-
able to the public sector is broader than c,insofar as the nominal 
rate of return on interest-bearing debt can be held doWllo 
Note, too, that the same result holds if we 
relax the relevant condition concerning the initial rate of inflation, 
namely (1.7a)~ and introduce the money-market conditions (l.lb)' and 
(1.2b)'. For under a pegged nominal interest rate, fixed real per 
capita output, and no 'wealth' demand for money, we have 
dc* dc* 
= 0 = 
- -
, (l.12b )' 
dg dt 
a result which can be used instead of (1.7a)' to derive (1.12a)t. 
Is aggregate real per capita public debt invariant with respect 
to increased public spending? Insert (1.2a)' into (l.la)', and then 
recall (l.lOb)' and (l.lOe)', to obtain 
w* = 
whence, from (1.5b)' and (1.12a)' , 
dw* 
-dg 
= - (s + L/W*) 
w 
(1.13)1 
(l.12c)' 
That is, an increase in real per capita public spending will drive dawn 
real per capita public debt. This is because the associated reduction 
in real per capita disposable income and the real interest rare both 
imply reduced 'target' real per capita wealth holdings, where that 
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target is implicit in our specification of the private expenditure 
function (lo2a)io Another implication of (1.13)', together with (105)i 
and (lo12a)',is that a reduction in real per capita net explicit taxes 
will also drive dawn real per capita public debt, but by a lesser 
amount since real income is invariant with respect to net explicit 
taxes. 
The Monetary Regime 
What we termed the basic comparative-statics result of the 
monetary approach, namely dn*/d~ = 1, follows directly from (lolOa)' 
and (l.lOc)to This proposition requires no further commento 
More noteworthy is the monetary counterpart of (1012a)t: 
apply (106)' and (1.7)t to (lolld)', to obtain 
d6* 
-
= c* 0 (10 l4a) r 
d~ 
A unit increase in the rate of nominal monetary growth will raise the 
steady-state legislated deficit by the real per capita stock of mone-
tized public debto This proposition can be related to an implication 
of Christ's budgetary approach (see Section 1)0 Specifically, if the 
initial tax rate is zero, then Christ's analysis yields dD*/du = y*. 
Equation (1.l4a)t is tdual' to that proposition in the sense that the 
inflation-tax rate, ~, supplants the income-tax rate,u; and the re1e-
vant inflation-tax base, c, takes the place of the income-tax base, Y. 
Under a pegged real interest rate, the relevant inflation-tax base is 
the stock of monetized public debt, as in the conventional theory of 
inflation taxes. 
As with our discussion of (1.12a)t, let us relax the initial 
condition (lo7a)t and introduce the money-market conditions (lolb)' 
and (1.2b)r. Under a pegged real interest rate and fixed real per 
capita output we have 
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dc* 
-dlJl 
which is just the standard result on the fflight from real balances' 
in the presence of alternative assets whose real rate of return is in-
variant with respect to increased inflation. 
We are now in a position to generalize (1.14a)r: 
d6* 
-_- = c*(l-a, r*) 
d~ 
where the additional term (as compared with (1.14a)') reflects the re-
duction in the inflation-tax base induced by higher inflation. The 
maximum legislated deficit is obtained when 
a,r* = 1 , 
that is, when the interest elasticity of demand for real balances is 
unity. This is a famous result in the theory of inflation and other 
taxes (see, eogo, Friedman (1971». That the unit elasticity is a 
maximum rather than a minimum may be seen by observing that 
~t. 
cx,c" < 0 
at the turning point under consideration. (More on this in Chapters 
III and IV.) 
Finally, it is clear from (1.13)f that the real per capita 
stock of aggregate public debt is invariant with respect to monetary 
expansion when the interest rate and per capita public spending are 
pegged in real terms. In summary, the only real effects are that net 
explicit taxes fall (rise) one-to-one with the rise (fall) in inflation-
tax revenues, and bond holdings rise one-to-one with the fall in money 
holdings, in real per capita terms. By contrast, increased public 
spending under the budgetary regime was shawn to have more pronounced 
real effects, a s one would expect. 
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5. STABILITY 
This section considers the local stability of the system under 
the alternative policy regimes. By way of preliminary we reduce the 
dimensionality of the systemo Insert (1.3)! into (lo2a)f, and the 
resulting expression into (l.la)f o Similarly, insert (102b)V into 
(l.lb) v; (lolc) f and (1.2c) , into (104a) '; and (lo2c) t into (lo4b) fo 
This gives 
-q = z + (l-s)[q-t + p(w-c) - TTC - nw] - t., p + ww - g (10 15a) r 
c = k q¢ exp[- cx (p+n) ] (1.15b) • 
. - [n + y(q-qF)]w w = g - t + p (w-c) - TIC - (loI5c)' 
. 
t3 y(q-qF) (1.15d)· 11 = 
To close the system, impose 
t = t and p + TT = r 
or (loI5e)! 
• 
c[\JI y(q-q ) - n] and c - TT - P = p F 
according as whether the budgetary or the monetary regime is the object 
of interest. Finally, we invoke the initial conditions (1.7)! when we 
go to the perturbed counterpart of the above system. 
The Budgetary Regime 
Under the budgetary regime the system's characteristic poly-
nomial is 
- A o t3y 
- w* 
-A -yw* 
K(A.;t,r) = 
(l-s )w* - t., 
-w s 
Setting K(A.;t,r) equal to zero gives 
2 A s + AY[W*[W + t3(l -s)] - t3 t., } + t3yww* = 0 • 
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The necessary and sufficient condition for stability is that the 
eigenvalues have negative real parts, ioeo, that the coefficients of 
i A , i=O,1,2, each be positiveo Given the parameter restrictions in-
troduced in the main text, the only ambiguous term is 
y[w*[w + ~(l-s)] - ~L} 0 
Assuming the marginal propensity to consume is positive (s < 1), 
the only destabilizing influence is the responsiveness of private de-
mand to the anticipated real interest rate. Specifically, an increase 
in the anticipated rate of inflation will lower the real interest rate, 
which will raise private demand, which raises actual inflation and the 
rate of change of anticipated inflation. This scenario is the basis of 
a well-known objection to pegged nominal interest rates. 
Offsetting this possible train of events--and dominating it, if 
the system is stable--are two influences. First, an increase in the ex-
pected rate of inflation will reduce anticipated real per capita private 
disposable income, which reduces private demand, actual inflation, and 
the absolute rate of change of anticipated inflation. Second, if output 
rises above capacity, the resulting increase in actual inflation will 
slow down the rate of change of real per capita public debt, which 
tends to restore output to capacity via the wealth effect in aggregate 
demand. 
In summary, the inflation tax is necessary for stability, and 
a positive responsive of private expenditure to a reduced antici-
pated real interest rate is necessary for instabilityo 
In the case of perfect myopic foresight of the inflation rate 
(~ - 00), the system reduces to a first-order differential equation 
with eigenvalue A = -w/[(l-s)w* - L]o Again, stability is ambiguous, 
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and the economic considerations underlying its presence or absence are 
broadly similar to those discussed aboveo Thus, the possibility of sta-
bility in a model with "passive money" (and without price-level jumps 
and terminal conditions on asset stocks) is not as far fetched as has 
been supposed (see, e.go, Sargent and Wallace (1973»0 The important 
point is that the inflation tax is a critical stabilizing influence. 
Its role is analogous to that of the explicit tax on factor incomes in 
Christ's (1968) stability analysiso 
Finally, in the case of fixed inflation expectations (~), the 
system again reduces to a first-order differential equation, with 
eigenvalue A = - aww*/so In this case, therefore, the system is un-
ambiguously stable. 
The Monetary Regime 
Under the monetary regime the system's characteristic polynomial 
is 
-A 0 0 f3y 0 
-k -A 0 
-yk 0 
- - -K(,,-;~,p) = -k 0 -A 0 -1 • 
(l-s) k 0 -(J.) s (l-s) 
ak 1 0 
-¢k 0 
Setting K(,,-;~,p) equal to zero gives 
[,,-(l-s) + W][A2¢ + Ay(l-af3) + f3y] = 0 0 
Given the parameter restrictions introduced in the main text, sufficient 
conditions for stability are 
s < 1 and af3 < 1 • 
The first of these conditions merely states that the marginal propen-
sity to consume is positive. More interesting is the second condition, 
which states that product of the responsiveness of money demand to its 
26 
opportunity cost, and the adjustment speed of inflationary expecta-
tions, is less than unit Yo This is precisely the criterion obtained 
by Cagan (1956) in his classic study of hyperinflations. Cagan found 
that this condition was satisfied for each of the hyperinflations he 
studiedo 
In the case of perfect myopic foresight of the inflation rate 
(~ ~ 00), the system yields a positive eigenvalue l/a, so that the 
system is unstable. This instability, which can also be deduced di-
rectly from the condition a~ < 1, is more in line with the findings 
of Sargent and Wallace (1973). On the other hand, it is worth pointing 
out that if the real interest rate and real per capita net explicit 
taxes are endogenous and pegged respectively, rather than the other 
way round, then pegging monetary growth will stabilize the system under 
perfect myopic foresight of the inflation rate. The proof of this pro-
position is straightforward, albeit tedious, and is not shawn. 
The case of fixed inflation expectations (~) is of special in-
terest now, since it encompasses the case TI = ~ + n, that is, inflation 
expectations are based on the fact that the public sector is known to 
peg monetary growth. This notion has attracted considerable attention 
lately. It is easily shown that the eigenvalues are then given by 
-w/(l-s) and -y/¢, so that the syste~ is stableo On the other hand, 
the system is unstable in the aforementioned case of pegged explicit 
taxes and an endogenous real interest rate. This result is in complete 
agreement with a result highlighted by Christ (1978). Equations (1015)1 
easily lend themselves to the task of generalizing it to the case of a 
positive yet finite expectations adjustment speed (0 < ~ < 00)0 
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We have discussed two policy regimeso One the 'budgetary' 
regime, is characterized by pegged rates of nominal interest and real 
per capita public spending and net explicit taxeso The other, 
'monetary' regime is characterized by pegged rates of nominal monetary 
growth, real interest, and real per capita public spending 0 It was 
argued that in either case, expansionary policy under the regime in 
question can be identified with a popular view on inflation, one 
asserting 'active' deficits and 'passive' money, and the other vice 
versa. 
Within this framework we performed various exercises in short-
run and long-run comparative staticso The short run was characterized 
by predetermined levels of aggregate public debt, the price level, and 
the anticipated inflation rate. (For the monetary regime we also took 
the stock of monetized public debt to be predetermined.) The short-run 
results yield a conventional income-multiplier or income-velocity ex-
planation of the transmission mechanism, according as whether one 
adopts the budgetary or monetary characterization of expansionary 
policy. 
The long-run results, on the other hand, contain some novelties, 
as do those on stability. Recalling that the difference between pub-
lic spending and net explicit taxes was termed the 'legislated' deficit, 
our main results can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Under either policy regime, steady-state private di sposable 
income is given by the difference between output and public 
spending·. It follows that disposable income will decline 
one-to-one with an increase in public spending, but is in-
variant with respect to any change in net explicit taxeso 
2. Under the budgetary regime, a unit increase in the real 
per capita legislated deficit will raise the rates of in-
flation and nominal monetary growth by the inverse of the 
real per capita stock of aggregate public debt. 5 
3. Under the monetary regime, an increase in nominal monetary 
growth will raise the legislated deficit by the real per 
capita stock of monetized public debt, less the product of 
that variable and the interest elasticity of money demando 6 
4. Under the budgetary regime, the system may be stable even 
under perfect myopic foresight of the inflation rate. The 
inflation tax is necessary for stability, and a positive 
response of private expenditures to a reduced anticipated 
real interest rate is necessary for instability. 
Finally, under the monetary regime .too, the stability findings 
are noteworthy in that the critical stability criterion is precisely 
the same as that obtained by Cagan (1956), even though we worked with 
a third-order system involving the public-sector constraint, unemploy-
ment transients, and other complications, whereas Cagan's well-known 
model is first-order. The limiting case of perfect myopic foresight 
of the inflation rate yields a second-order system with the familiar 
saddlepoint instability property. 
CHAPTER II 
INFLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN A SMALL ECONOMY UNDER 
FIXED EXCHANGE RATES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For a decade now, there has been intensive study of the causes 
and consequences of inflation in a small economy under fixed exchange 
rates, and the relationship of that issue to domestic policy . 
Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three stages in the evolution 
of the theoretical literature. 
The first stage was extension of the Keynes-Phillips analysis 
of a closed economy to the case of a small open economy; see, e.g., 
Takayama (1969), Helliwell (1969), and Turnovsky and Kaspura (1974). 
These models tend to be short run, and focus (usually) upon the price 
level rather than the inflation rate. The effects of domestic fiscal 
and monetary policies received somewhat more attention than the ques-
tion of imported inflation, although obviously those issues are 
closely related. 
The second stage was the monetary approach, which in the pre-
sent context should be taken to refer to an explanation of the balance 
of payments as well as inflation. The major contributions deal with 
the multi-country case and often flexible rates as well; see, e.g. 
Mundell (1971), Johnson (1973), Dornbusch (1973), and Girton and Roper 
(1977). But there are some noteworthy discussions which specifically 
proceed from the standpoint of a small open economy under fixed rates; 
see, e.g. Mundell (1971, Ch. 9), Shinkai (1973), and Dornbusch (1974). 
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One difference between the monetary and Keynes-Phillips 
approaches is that the former emphasizes the long-run equilibrium re-
lationships which were outlined at the outset of Chapter Io For ex-
ample, an elementary consequence of purchasing power parity applied 
to fixed parities is that a 1 percent increase in the foreign infla-
tion rate will ultimately raise the domestic inflation and monetary 
growth rates by 1 percent, whereas domestic policy disturbances will 
have no effect on those rates. Another difference is greater emphasis 
on stock-adjustment phenomena, especially those relating to desired 
real balanceso Finally (and perhaps this is the most striking differ-
ence), the monetary models abstract from the income-multiplier process, 
that being central to the conventional explanation of 'soft' aggregate 
demand and its unemployment ramificationso 
The third stage has been to combine Keynes-Phillips and mone-
tary ingredients, and others as well. The basic simplifying assumption 
underlying this approach is to treat variables such as stocks of finan-
cial wealth, inflation expectations and relative prices as predetermined 
or 'state' variables in the short run o 
Comparatively early and straightforward examples include Parkin 
(1974) and Laidler (1975). The interest in additional complications is 
a little more recento For example, Kierzkowski (1976) rectifies short-
comings of early work on the so-called 'Scandinavian' case of sheltered 
and exposed sectors with differing rates of secular productivity growth, 
Boyer (1977) and Branson (1977) emphasize portfolio effects, Kingston 
and Turnovsky (1978) pay particular attention to the appropriate speci-
fication of flaw constraints, and Parkin (1978) goes to the case of 
rational expectations under either fixed or flexible rates. 
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These recent models can be summarized as exhibiting Keynes-
Phillips properties in the short run, and monetary properties in the 
long run; although some monetary aspects, particularly in regard to 
the balance of payments, are apparent in the short run as well. 
By opening up the model of the preceding chapter to interna-
tional trade in goods and interest-bearing public debt, this chapter 
develops another fthird generation' model of a small economy under 
fixed rates. Kingston and Turnovsky (1978) is the basic source. 
Thus, expansionary domestic policy is a major object of interest, as 
is the proper accounting for inflation, interest and growth in the bud-
get constraints of the public and private sectors. In addition, we 
consider the effects of an increase in the domestic-currency price of 
imports (induced either by an increase in the price of foreign currency 
or by an increase in the foreign-currency price of imports), and an in-
crease in the rate of inflation of the foreign-currency price of im-
ports. Here it is worth pointing out that the focus will be on the tra-
ditional definition of a 'small' country, namely, a country that pro-
duces a single, endogenously-priced good, which is partly exported and 
partly consumed domestically; and imports a single consumption good 
whose foreign-currency price is exogenous. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 
sets out the model. Section 3 considers the short run. Section 4 con-
siders the long run. Section 5 examines the stability of the model. 
Section 6 offers a summary. 
20 THE MODEL 
Assumptions 
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Adapting the Chapter I model to the task at hand requires the 
following modifications of the assumptions set out there. First, the 
interactions between the home economy and the rest of the world must 
be specifiedo Second, some care is required to ensure that the as-
sumed domestic policy regime is consistent with the assumed interna-
tional environment. Third, for a multi-commodity economy it is natural 
to define a CPl. Fourth, there is the question of appropriate simpli-
fying initial conditions and units in an open-economy frameworko 
With regard to the first point, this chapter assumes full inter-
national integration of the domestic capital market, partial integra-
tion of the goods market, and zero integration of the markets for 
domestic money stocks and labour 0 Additionally, at home and abroad 
the labour force grows at the same exogenously-given rate, and secular 
productivity growth is zeroo 
This environment rules out the 'monetary regime' of Chapter 10 
For it is well known that in a small country under fixed rates and 
zero productivity growth, the public sector must allow the rate of 
nominal domestic credit expansion to be consistent with endogeneity 
and long-run stationarity of the country's real intensive monetary bas e ; 
see, e.g., Swoboda (1973). Hence the rate of growth of nominal domestic 
credit must be permitted to be endogenous. On the other hand, recog-
nizing this constraint, and focusing on the case of perfect capital 
mobility, it is equally well known that the behaviour of domestic 
credit is unimportant in the sense that over any time horizon the 
only consequence of a given increase in domestic credit is to drive 
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out an equal quantity of international reserveso Accordingly, for con-
sistency, simplicity, and without important loss of generality, we 
assume the domestic public sector pegs the real per capita domestic 
source component 0 In nominal terms, therefore, domestic credit ex-
pands at a rate equal to domestic price growth plus world labour-force 
growtho It would make no significant difference if, for instance, the 
domestic public sector were to peg the proportional reserve backing 
of the domestic monetary base --as assumed, for example, in Johnson 
(1973) and Chapter IV below. 
Another constraint arises from perfect capital mobility per see 
Suppose the home public sector were to issue interest bearing debt at 
a rate permanently in excess of the sum of the secular inflation rate 
and growth rate of the world economy. Then in the absence of unequal 
productivity growth at home and abroad, it is inconceivable that the 
rest of the world would continue to view the small country's securities 
as perfect substitutes for its own. Nor is it conceivable that the 
domestic public sector would issue debt at a rate permanently below the 
secular global inflation-cum-growth rate; in that event the domestic 
public sector would accumulate claims on other sectors, in real per 
capita terms, without limit. In short, the real per capita aggregate 
debt of the domestic public sector must eventually be stationary in 
real per capita terms; not just the real per capita monetized debt of 
the domestic public sector. 
It follows that the home fiscal authority must eventually pick 
rates of spending and net explicit taxation which together ensure sta-
tionarity of its real per capita public debt$ If rates of nominal 
monetary growth and real interest in the rest of the world conform to 
the full-liquidity and golden rules respectively, then it turns out that 
the legislated deficit of the home public sector must equal zero. If, 
on the other hand, nominal monetary growth in the rest of the world is 
in excess of the full-liquidity rate (with the real interest rate con-
tinuing to conform to the full-liquidity rule) then the domestic 
public sector must spend more than its net explicit tax receiptso 
As an empirical matter, however, one would expect this con-
straint to apply only in the very long run, so that quasi-equilibria 
of the kind discussed by Mundell (1968), Swoboda (1972), and Turnovsky 
(1977, Ch. 11) are worthy of attention. Accordingly, we shall consider 
three kinds of equilibria: the short run; a steady state quasi equili-
brium wherein there is a current-account deficit (surplus), financed by 
a matching capital-account surplus (deficit) and created by a sustained 
domestic budget deficit (surplus); and long-run full equilibrium. 
The remaining aspects of our specification of public policy 
are as follows. To peg the price of the domestic currency, the do-
mestic public sector is assumed to maintain a stockpile of the 
interest-bearing liabilities of the rest of the world. This assump-
tion is chosen in preference to the traditional one of noninterest-
bearing international reserves partly because of evidence that most 
reserves is the postwar period have been held in the form of interest-
bearing public debt (see, e.go, Whitman (1974)), and partly because 
this assumption turns out to be easier to work with than the traditional 
one, providing we assume also that the domestic-currency equivalent of 
the interest earned by international reserves is rebated to the domestic 
private sector by distributionally neutral means. But this last-
mentioned assumption turns out not to make a great deal of difference 
until the analysis is extended to two or more countries; see Chapter IV. 
35 
The domestic public sector is assumed also to peg its real 
per capita public spending and net explicit taxes, as in the case 
of the fbudgetary regime f discussed in Chapter 10 Public spending 
falls entirely on the home-produced good, explicit taxes are levied 
entirely on home private incomes, and the public debt is denominated 
wholly in terms of domestic currencyo Each of these assumptions 
admits various straightforward extensions. 
Third, turning to the question of a CPI, several authors have 
postulated a multiplicatively-weighted average of the price of the 
home good and the domestic-currency price of the foreign good; see, 
e.g., Boyer (1977), Kingston and Turnovsky (1978)0 Thus we intro-
duce 
where w used as a subscript denotes foreign variables, and 
P
d 
= domestic-currency cost of living in the home country, 
P = domestic-currency price of home output, 
P = foreign-currency price of foreign output, exogenous to 
w 
the small domestic economy, 
E = price of foreign currency, taken to be pegged, 
m = share of the foreign good in domestic private spending when 
the terms of trade are unity, m constant, 0 < m < 1. 
Whilst this form is typically chosen for convenience, it does 
have some theoretical merit. It is the 'true' cost of living index if 
the domestic residents' utility function, defined with domestic goods 
and imports as its arguments, is Cobb-Douglas; see, e.go, Samuelson 
and Swamy (1974)0 
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This and subsequent chapters utilize more frequently its 
equivalent versions 
where 0-
- EP Ip -
w 
inverse of the commodity terms of trade faced by 
the home country, 
0 
Pd - Pd/Pd = domestic-currency 
rate of inflation of the home 
cost of living, 
• 
p 
- PIP = domestic-currency rate of inflation of the price of 
domestic output, 
• 
- P Ip 
w w 
- foreign-currency rate of inflation of the price of 
foreign output, 
o 
e - E/E - rate of inflation of the price of foreign currency, 
or, the exchange depreciation rate, with e - 0 under 
fixed rates. 
Finally, with regard to initial conditions and convenient units, 
we shall continue to invoke Assumption 8 and equations (1.7)1 as is con-
venient. Those conditions turn out to imply that trade is balanced in 
the initial steady state. In addition, suppose that domestic portfolios 
are 'covered' in the initial state, by which we mean that a proportion 
m of domestic private wealth is allocated to bonds denominated in 
foreign currencies. In consequence, domestic wealth in terms of over-
all purchasing power is invariant at each instant with respect to a 
devaluation (see Section 3). If devaluations and revaluations of the 
domestic currency are viewed by the domestic private sector as equi-
probable events (and that is the natural starting point of devalua-
tion analysis), then this portfolio allocation will be the optimal 
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hedging strategy, providing investors are risk averse. See Girton 
and Henderson (1977), and Boyer (1977) for analyses of 'uncovered' 
initial portfolio allocations. And on the question of appropriate 
units, we set the price of foreign exchange and the terms of trade 
equal to unity in the inital stateo 
The Model 
Exposition of the model follows the general format of the 
Chapter I counterpart of this sectiono First, market-clearing 
assumptions, and a definition of the legislated deficit are set out 
(cf. equations (1.1)): 
-Q:::Z+G+X, q=z+g+x (20 la), (20 la) 1r 
C + F = L , c +f - /; (2olb), (2.lb)t 
D=G-T, -o = g - t (2.lc), (2olc)1r 
where q ::: Q/PN = per capita supply of the domestic good, mea-
sured in terms of itself, 
z ::: Z/PN = per capita supply of aggregate domestic private 
demand, measured in terms of the domestic good, 
x - X/PN = per capita domestic trade balance, measured in 
terms of the domestic good, 
c - C/PN = per capita domestic source component of the do-
mestic monetary base, measured in terms of the 
domestic good, and taken to be pegged, 
f - F/PN == per capita foreign source component of the do-
mestic monetary base, measured in terms of the 
domestic good; 
and g, t, /; and 0 require no further discussiono 
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Equation (2olb)f embodies our assumption that the 'real' per 
capita domestic source component of the domestic monetary base is 
pegged. By defining 'real' here to mean purchasing power over the 
home good, it is implied that the domestic public sector does not 
monetize the capital gains on its reserves that ensue from a devalu-
ationo See Mundell (1971, Ch. 9) for a detailed discussion both of 
this case, and of alternative budgetary processes whereby the public 
sector views such capital gains as a source of revenue available for 
widening its legislated deficit. 
Consider now the equations explaining private demand for goods 
and money, the aggregate supply of goods, and the trade balance: 
where 
z = z + (l-s)y - L(r - TI) + ww 
w 
t - kq¢ exp(-ar ) 
w 
p - y(q - qF) + TI 
11 
x - Swo- w mz 0-1-11 
(2.2a)' 
(2.2b)' 
(2.2c)' 
(2.2d) f 
y - per capita anticipated private disposable income, 
r - 11 == 
r = r = 
w 
TI -
measured in terms of the domestic cost of living 
(see (2.31 below, 
anticipated real interest rate, measured in terms 
of the domestic cost of living, 
domestic nominal interest rate, tied to the exo-
genously-given world rate r , 
vl 
anticipated rate of inflation of the domestic 
cost of living, 
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w - W/PdN = per capita wealth of the domestic private sector, 
measured in terms of the domestic cost of living, 
foreign demand for real per capita domestic out-
put in the initial state, a constant, 
foreign Slutsky-compensated price elasticity of 
demand for domestic output, a constant, 
11 = domestic Slutsky-compensated price elasticity of 
demand for foreign output, a constant. 
The choice of units for money demand warrants further comment. 
It might appear more reasonable to write the left-hand side of (2.2b)t 
as L/PdN rather than L/PN. But if we reduce the right-hand side to 
the elementary 'Cambridge' case ¢ = 1 (a unitary 'income' elasticity 
of money-demand) and a = 0 (no opportunity cost of holding real bal-
ances), then our specification reduces to the familiar L = kQ, whereas 
the above-mentioned alternative gives rise to the non-standard formu-
lation L = kc?Q • Also, the empirical study by Grassman (1976) sug-
gests that P rather than Pd is the appropriate choice of deflator. 
All the constants in (1.2)1 are positive. Our constant-
elasticity specifications of export and import demands are for con-
venience. The export function is written solely in terms of relative 
prices, reflecting the fact that all the other determinants of export 
demand are exogenous to the small domestic economy and can ther efore 
be embodied in the constant term ~. 
Consider next the equations for nominal and real per capita 
private disposable income: 
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- -m - -m - -m Y = Q-T+r (W-C), y =(q-t)~ +(r - n )(w-c~ ) - nc ~ - nw 
w w 
(2.3),(203)' 
Equation (203) parallels its closed-economy counterpart (1.3)0 To see 
the role of our assumption that interest payments on international re-
serves are rebated to the private sector, observe that domestic pri-
vate holdings of the interest-bearing debt issued by the domestic or 
foreign public sectors is given by W-L (not W-C), and note that (203) 
can be written as Y = Q - T + r (W-L) + r Fo 
w w 
The components of (2.3)' are measured in terms of the domestic 
cost of living (rather than the domestic good), so that the model in-
corporates both the income and wealth effects of a change in the terms 
of trade (see, e.g., Laursen and Metzler (1950) and Dornbusch (1973) 
respectively). Evidently we have opted for an index-number solution 
to the problem of incorporating these effects, as proposed some time 
ago in the case of the income effect (see Machlup (1956». 
We now turn to the dynamic equations of the modelo These de-
scribe the accumulation of assets, the formation of inflation expecta-
tions and the evolution of the terms of trade. 
The equation for the accumulation of assets by the domestic 
private sector may be derived from two other equations. One is the 
domestic public-sector constraint and the other is the domestic bal-
ance of payments. The former has nominal and real per capita forms 
v = D + r (V-C), v = 6 + (r -p)(v-;) - pc - nv 
w w 
(204a),(2.4a)' 
where v = V/PN = per capita aggregate public debt issued by the 
domestic public sector, measured in units of the 
domestic good, 
so that v-c is the domestic public sector's real per capita interest-
hearing debt. These equations parallel their closed-economy 
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counterparts (1.4a) and (1.4a)'o To see the role of our assumption 
that interest payments on international reserves are rebated to the 
private sector, simply add r F to both sides of (204a). 
w 
The equation for the domestic balance of payments has nominal 
and real per capita forms 
o 
F=X+r (W-V) + (V:C)-(W:L), f - • x + (r -p)(w-v) + (v-c) 
w 
(w':..e,) - n(w-v) • 
w 
(204b), (2.4b) t 
Equation (2.4b) says that the balance of payments is equal to the 
trade balance X, plus interest earnings from the net indebtedness of 
the rest of the world to the domestic country, r (W-V), plus the 
w 
o • 
capital account balance, (V-C) - (W-L), where each of these items is 
expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Equation (204b)1 re-
veals that in real intensive terms, net domestic 
earnings from the net indebtedness of the rest of the world are reduced 
by the inflation-cum-growth tax on that indebtedness, i.e. (p+n) (w-v). 
To explain the accumulation of assets by the domestic private 
sector, use (2.lb) to eliminate Land F from (2.4b), yielding 
• 
X + r (W-V) + (V-W) = 0 , 
w 
and then use (2.4a) to eliminate V, which leads to the nominal and 
real per capita forms of the wealth accumulation equation: 
W = D + X + r (W- C) , 
w 
-
(2. Sa) 
w - 6+x + [r -(l-m)p-mp ] (w 
m w w 
c c 
--)-[(l-m)p+mp ] -- - nw (2.5a)' 
m w m 
IT cr IT 
Equation (2.5a) says that the rate of accumulation of aggregate public 
debt by the domestic private sector is equal to the domestic legislated 
deficit D, plus the trade surplus X, plus interest earned from domestic 
private holdings of interest-bearing public debt together with 
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domestic public holdings of reserves, r (W-C)(= r (W-L) + r F) where 
w w w 
each of these items is expressed in terms of the domestic currencyo 
Equation (2oSa)' reveals that in real intensive terms, where 'real' 
here means overall domestic purchasing power, inflation and growth 
taxes must be taken into account. It also incorporates tedious but 
straightforward conversions, involving ~, to ensure items are commen-
surateo 
The formation of inflationary expectations is explained by 
IT = 13[ (l-m)p + mp - TTl, 
w 
(2.Sb) , 
which is just the analogue of (1.4b)' in a two-commodity world. 
The evolution of the terms of trade is described by 
a- = o-(p -p) 
w 
(2.Sc)' 
which follows from the identity a- = ~(p + e - p) together with our 
w 
assumption e = 0, where the identity in question holds only for points 
in time at which P, P and E are differentiable with respect to time. 
w 
With respect to our assumptions concerning 'sluggish adjustment', we 
assume that W, P, P , Nand TT have that property. Thus two impacts of 
w 
a devaluation are first, the level of the domestic-currency price of 
imports rises by the full amount of the devaluation, and second, the 
domestic-currency price of the home good does not change 0 
This concludes the exposition of the dynamic relationships. 
The model as a whole, therefore, contains the instantaneous relation-
ships (2.1)' to (2.3)', which determine q, z, x, £, f, p, and y; the 
dynamic relationships 
mined variables w, TT, 
(2.5)' , 
1 
and 0-; 
which proximately explain the predeter-
- - -the policy variables, g, t, c, and E; and 
various exogenous variables and parameters including P ,p and r 0 
w w w 
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The real per capita aggregate public debt of the domestic public sec-
tor, v, is determined recursively by the above equations together with 
(2.4a)'; and in the absence of jumps in t or ~, real per capita re-
serves f are proximately explained by (204b)'o For a summary of the 
model, see Section 5. 
The exposition of the model as a whole is finalised by repro-
ducing our closed-economy initial conditions (1 07)' and introducing 
new initial conditionso Thus: 
It. = ° 0 = ° p -n = 0, t = k 
"0 '  '0 0 
(206a)', (2.6b)',(2.6c)', (206d)' 
o 
where ~ = clc = rate of growth of nominal domestic credit. Under 
(2.6c)', and in the steady state, (2.6a)' is equivalent to (2.6b)', 
and/or anyone of 
• 
TI +n = 0, p +n = 0, p +n = 0, (L/L) 
o 0 w 0 
= 0 , 
• 
(F /F) = 0, x = 0, 
o 0 
where the x = ° equivalence holds only in full equilibrium. Further 
o 
aspects of these equivalences are discussed in Section 4. As in 
Chapter I, qo = 1. Finally, units are chosen so that 
a- = 1, E = 1 • 
o 0 
(2. 6e) , , (2.6 f) 
Our next topic is the comparative statics of the short runo 
3. THE SHORT RUN 
Fiscal Expansion 
Consider first the impacts of increased spending by the 
domestic public sector. Equations (2.la)', (2.2a)', (2.2d)' and 
(206)' together yield 
~ 1 
- = l-h ' dg 
(2.7a)' 
44 
where h - (l-s)(l-m) = marginal propensity of the domestic private 
sector to spend its income on the home goodo 
Equation (1.7a)' is merely a way of expressing the standard foreign 
trade multiplier. Stability considerations suggest h < 1 (see 
Section 5)0 Assume that inequality. 
This result leads to the impacts 
~ =-L dPd y(l-m) 
-
- l-h , - l-h dg dg 
df d£ =~ 
--
- - l-h dg dg 
dz 1 dx -~l-h-s) 
--- -
> -1 
- l-h , dg 1 - h dg 
~ (= ~) 1 ---
- dg l-h dg 
These results, too, are straightforward. The increase in do-
mestic output will raise the rate of inflation of the price of the 
domestic good. The rate of inflation of the overall cost of living 
will rise also; though not by as much. The increased transactions 
demand for money, coupled with the pegged domestic source component, 
will induce a stock-shift improvement in the economy's external re-
serves. The increase in aggregate domestic spending, on the other 
hand, and (in particular) increased imports, leads to a deterioration 
in the domestic trade balance. Finally, anticipated real per capita 
private disposable income will rise by the same amount as output. 
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Devaluation 
Consider next the effects of a devaluation which is unantici-
pated and expected never to be repeated once it occurs. It is con-
venient to begin with the impact on domestic wealth and the cost of 
living 0 Since w = W/PdN we have 
dw PdN(dW/dE) - WN(d Pd/dE) 
= =mw-IIM-O. 
dE (Pd N)2 
With 'covered' domestic portfolios, a 1 percent devaluation will 
raise nominal domestic wealth by m percent. On the other hand, it will 
also raise the domestic-currency price of imports and thence the do-
mestic cost of living by m percent, so that the overall purchasing power 
of domestic wealth is unchanged. This result is contrary to its 
analogue in simple monetary models (see, e.g., Mundell (1971), 
Swoboda (1977)), which assume that domestic currency is the only 
asset in domestic portfolios,so that in the short run a devaluation will 
reduce the overall purchasing power of domestic wealth, and can be 
likened to a capital levy by the domestic public sector on the domestic 
private sector (Mundell (1971, Ch. 9)). 
Turning to the effect of the disturbance in question on domestic 
output, first recall (2.la)', (2.2a)', (202d)l, (206)', and the result 
dw/dE = 0; then note that y ~ z and mz ~ Sw in the neighbourhood of the 
initial steady state. This yields 
~ 
dE 
- (20 8a)' 
~[ 11 + " - (l+h)] 
1 - h 
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Assuming h < 1, our criterion for a devaluation to raise output in 
the short run is that the sum of the Slutsky-compensated price elas-
ticities of import and export demand, ~ + ~, exceed unity plus the 
marginal propensity of domestic residents to consume the home good, 
1 + hD This is a more stringent condition than one often found in the 
literature, namely, ~ + '\., - 1 > 0 (see, e.g., Johnson (1978»0 The 
reason for the difference is that the literature often abstracts from 
the income effect of a currency depreciation (with Laursen and Metzler 
(1950) being the classic exception to that popular omission). 
Using this result we deduce the impacts 
~ ygw[Ttr\ - (l+h)] dPd Y(l-m);JT1+\ - (l+h) ] 
== == 1 - h , 1 - h dE dE 
df dt ¢k~[T1+" - (l+h)] 
-- == 
dE dE 1 - h 
dz (l-s)SJT1+'\., - 2) dx ~ 
== == ~[s(~~ - 1) + (l-s-h)] 1 - h , l-h . dE dE 
(2.8b)! 
The rates of inflation of the price of the domestic good and the over-
all cost of living, and the level of reserves in domestic currency, 
will all increase or decrease according as whether domestic output 
rises or falls; the explanation is essentially the same as that given 
in connection with the public spending multipliers. Note that the 
criterion for a devaluation to improve reserves measured in terms of 
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foreign currency is more stringent than ~ + ~ > 1 + h, since 
d(PNf/E)/dE ~ PN(df/dE - f) ~ PN(df/dE)o 
The criterion for a devaluation to improve per capita domestic 
private spending measured in terms of the domestic good, z, and antici-
pated per capita private disposable income measured in terms of the 
overall cost of living, y, are also more stringent than the output cri-
terion. This is a consequence of the income (or iterms-of-trade') 
effect discussed above. Finally, the ordinary Marshall-Lerner criterion, 
i.e., ~ + ~ - 1 > 0, is sufficient to ensure that a devaluation will 
improve the trade balance, given a positive marginal propensity 
to spend on imports out of disposable income, i.e., l-h-s > O. 
Foreign Inflation 
Consider finally the effects of an increase in the foreign-
currency price of imports P ,and of an increase in the rate of in-
w 
flation of the foreign-currency price of imports, p 0 
w 
Once again it is convenient to begin with the impact on do-
mestic wealth and the cost of livingo We have 
dw 
dP 
w 
PdN(dW/dP
w
) - WN(dPd/dP
w
) 
~ ----------~--------------~ 
(P
d
N)2 
--IIlW o 
In contrast to our treatment of the price of foreign exchange, we 
have set up the model in a way that does not let the private sector 
hedge against increases in the foreign-currency price of importso 
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Hence an increase in the foreign-currency price of imports will reduce 
the overall purchasing power of domestic wealth, as does an increase in 
Pd or E in simple monetary models. 
Turning to the effect of the disturbance in question on domestic 
output, proceed as for the derivation of (2.8a)', to obtain 
~ == ~ _ (h+s )WllM 
• dP l-h 
w dE 
(2.9) r 
The wealth effect of an increase in the foreign-currency price of im-
ports means that a devaluation which raises the domestic-currency 
price of imports by the same amount is more expansionary (or less con-
tractionary) than the disturbance presently under consideration. 
But the following illustrative calculation suggests that the 
difference is unlikely to be substantialo Consider (202a)'o If aggre-
gate domestic spending is approxi~tely homogeneous of degree one in 
-the neighbourhood of the golden-rule rate of interest, then z ~ tn. 
Moreover, we shall see that y ~ z in the neighbourhood of the initial 
full steady state. These considerations imply that private spending 
and wealth stand in the relation sz ~ ww. Together with (2.8a)' and 
the familiar approximation x ~ 0, that relationship yields 
E [~+ ~ - [1 + h + s(h+s)]} ~ = _~~ _____ 'w __________________ __ 
dP 1 - h • 
w 
If h ~ .7 and s ~ .1 then s(h+S) = .08, a number which is unlikely to 
be critical in determining the magnitude of dq/dP either on its own 
w 
, 
or vis-a-vis the magnitude of dq/dE. 
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The upshot of this illustrative calculation is that in the short 
run, the elasticity and income effects are likely to dominate the 
wealth effect of the disturbance in question. This line of reasoning, 
which carries over to the other impact multipliers (in particular 
df/dP and dx/dP ), is contrary to the thrust of much recent analysis; 
w w 
see, e.g., Johnson (1978). 
Other impacts of an increase in the foreign-currency price of 
imports may be derived _ and analyzed in an entirely similar fashion. 
There is nothing of substance to be added to our derivations and dis-
cussions of (2.8b)t and (2.9a)t. 
We conclude this section by considering the impacts of an in-
crease in p. Suppose first that there is no accompanying increase in 
w 
the foreign nominal interest rate r. Then the Chapter I discussion 
w 
of the impacts of an increased rate of nominal monetary growth is 
relevant. Specifically, the levels of the instantaneous variables are 
independent of p ~ith the impact dPd/dp = m being a trivial exception) 
w w 
but their rates of change are not. 
In the present case, the relevant transmission mechanisms are 
threefold, involving the rates of change of real per capita wealth, 
inflation expectations, and the terms of trade. Equations (2.5)' and 
(2.6)' together yield 
• dw 
dp 
w 
= - II1W, 
• dTT 
dp 
w 
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m~, dO-dp 
w 
= 0- 0 
Observing that q = q(w, TT, ~) and proceeding as for (2.8a)t and 
(2.9a)t we deduce 
. 
~ = ~ + m(l-m)~ 
d p. dP 1 - h 
w w 
(2.10)' 
so that the interpretation of (2.10)' parallels that of (2.9)f, ex-
cept that now there is an additional positive term due to the negative 
impact of an increase in p on the absolute rate of change of the 
w 
• 
anticipated real interest rate, (r - TT). Analogous reasoning carries 
w 
over to the other p impacts. 
w 
Suppose now that an increase in Pw is accompanied by an in-
crease in the foreign nominal interest rate r 0 Then it is clear \ w 
from the foregoing that all that matters for the levels of the in-
stantaneous variables (except for f d ) is the increase in rw. Indeed, 
the disturbance in question and its short-run effects are completely 
analogous to those of an interest-rate hike in a closed economy under 
the budgetary regime (see Chapter I). Thus, for example, there are 
substitution and income effects in the product market; and since the 
former are conventionally viewed as dominant, there is a presumption 
that domestic output and the rate of inflation of its price will both 
fall. 
We conclude this section by drawing attention to a pitfall of 
our analysis of the domestic effects of increases in the level and 
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rate of change of the foreign-currency price of importso If one 
views inflation as being some kind of sustained public-sector dis-
turbance, then the analysis of 'imported inflation' should proceed 
from a specific model of the behavior of the foreign public sector, 
and should recognize that its domestic impacts will operate through 
the entire vector of foreign variables impinging on the domestic 
economy, namely (P
w
' Pw' rw' Sw). In short, a multi-country ana-
lysis is required. 
40 THE LONG RUN 
First this section considers some long-run equilibrium rela-
tionships which are valid under either quasi or full long-run equi-
librium. Then it distinguishes between those alternative character-
izations of the long run, and gives an account of their specific 
properties. 
Long-Run Equilibrium Relationships 
The definition of Pd and p, and equations (2.1)1 to (2.5)', 
together yield the steady-state relationships 
* (2.lla)t p* - Pc - 11* = Pw 
p* - r* 11* = r - Pw - Pw (2ollb)t w 
q* = qF (2. llc) t 
• • 
0 
(L/L)* = ~* - (F /F)* = (W/W)* - Pw + n (2.lld)f 
- (2oI1e)t z* = q - g - x* F 
-m (2ollf)t y* - z >"(0-*) • 
Equations (2.lla)' and (2.llb)' state that anticipated and 
actual rates of domestic inflation and real interest are tied to their 
exogenously-given world counterparts. Equation (2.llc)' says that 
domestic real per capita output is tied to its 'natural rate'o 
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Equations (2.lld)t say that the rates of growth of all nominal do-
mestic financial quantities (with the uquasi exceptionu of V) are tied 
2 
to the inflation-currrgrowth rate of the world economy 0 Finally, 
(20lle)' and (201lf)f are just the open-economy counterparts of (lolle)t 
and (1. 11 f) t 0 
As a direct consequence of these relationships we observe that 
the long-run effects of fiscal policy on domestic output, inflation 
and interest rates are zero, as are those of a devaluation or an in-
crease in the foreign price level. A 1 percent increase in the 
foreign inflation rate will raise the rates of growth of domestic 
nominal variables (with the possible exception of V) by 1 percent. 
These relationships, together with (2.lb)t and (2.2b)', show that 
the real per capita domestic money supply and reserve stock, measured 
in terms of the domestic good, are also invariant with respect to the 
above disturbances, unless an increase in the foreign inflation rate 
is accompanied by an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate, in 
which event the effects parallel those of increased nominal monetary 
growth in a closed economy (see Chapter I). Finally, any increase in 
domestic real per capita public spending will reduce the sum of real 
per capita foreign and private domestic spending on the home good, 
z* + x*, by the same amount. 
L R Qu 0 E °lob 0 3 Ong- unas~ qu~ ~ r~um 
Proceeding as for equations (2011) f, 
-
-x* = 6 - (p + n)c 
w 
-
v* = 6 (p + n)c 
w 
(2.l2b)f 
5;3 
Equation (2012a)' says that as a consequence of the cessation 
of domestic wealth accumulation in real per capita terms, and if the 
world interest rate conforms to the golden rule, then the quasi-
equilibrium domestic trade deficit will equal the domestic 'legislated! 
budget deficit minus the inflation-cum-growth tax on the real per capita 
monetized debt of the domestic public sector. 
This proposition stands in marked contrast to the 'New School' 
theory of external balance, which asserts x* + 6* ~ 0 (see, e.g., 
Godley and Cripps (1973»0 That theory proceeds from two premises. 
First, as an accounting identity, what we have termed the 'legislated' 
deficit will equal the trade deficit plus the gap between private 
savings and investment. Second, the equilibrium gap between private 
savings and investment is zero. 
The incorrect reasoning in this argument is failure to recog-
nize that the relevant tax variable is net explicit taxes plus the 
inflation-currrgrowth tax, which means that one or the other of the 
above premises must be modified. The procedure adopted in this dis-
sertation, of course, has been to accept the nominal counterpart of 
the foregoing accounting identity (and also to set investment equal to 
zero), and then go on to show that the relevant tax variable in the 
real per capita counterpart of this and related identities includes 
the inflation-currrgrawth imposto 
As a final comment on this issue, it is worth pointing out that 
the trade deficit of most industrialized countries nowadays is seldom 
more than the 'legislated' deficit, as would be predicted by our 
approach. 
Equations (2.l2a)' and (2.l2b)' together embody the familiar 
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proposition that an equilibrium trade deficit is financed by a matching 
• • 
capital account surplus (observe that v* = (v* - c) = (v* - w*», and 
can be attributed to the domestic public sector's foreign borrowingo 
What are the comparative-static implications of a long-run 
quasi equilibrium? In the first place, equations (2012)f and (20lc)' 
together imply 
dx* dv* 1 =-- -
-
-dg dg 
(20 l3a) , 
dx* dv* 
-1 --- -
- -dt dt 
That is, any increase in spending by the domestic public sector on 
the home good will raise the home trade deficit and rate of external 
borrowing,by the same amounto The reverse is true for any increase 
in the net explicit taxes raised by the domestic public sector from 
the home private sector. These are standard propositions in the 
theory of small open economies under perfect capital mobility; see, 
e.go, Mundell (1968) and Turnovsky (1977, Ch. 11). 
Second, we have seen that any increase in spending by the do-
mestic public sector on the home good will also lower the quantity of 
domestic output consumed by other sectors, z* + x*, by the same 
amount. Analogous reasoning establishes that z* + x* is invariant 
with respect to any change in domestic net explicit taxes. These pro-
positions, (2.llf) ',and (2.13a)' together imply 
m dz* d [y*( cr*) ] 0 = -
- -dg dg 
m 
(2.l3b)1 
dz* d [y*( cr*) ] 
-1 = -
- -dt dt 
That :LS, domestic private spending and :Lncorne , measured in terms of 
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the home good, are invariant with respect to any increase in domestic 
public spending on the home good, but will decline one-to-one with 
any increase in the net explicit taxes imposed on the domestic pri-
vate sectoro This is precisely the reverse of one of our key closed-
economy propositions (see Chapter 1)0 
Third, using (2.2d)', (206e)f and (2ol3b)', we can establish 
1 dy * _ _--.-:1 __ _ 
-dg ~(11 + \ - 1) 'dg 11 + \ - 1 
(2.l3c)' 
= 
1 - m dy* dcr* 
~11 + \ - 1) , dt -dt 
Each of these expressions depends on the standard Marshall-Lerner cri-
terion, 11 + ~ - 1. In the standard barter model (see, e.g., Mundell 
(1968, Part I), and our model too (see Section 5), we require 
11 + \ - 1 > 0 for stability_ Accordingly, assume that this in-
equality is satisfied. 
It follows that an increase in public spending will improve 
the home terms of trade, and raise domestic disposable incomeo The 
point underlying the former result is simple: if the system in gen-
eral and the goods market in particular are stable, then increased de-
mand for the domestic good will raise its relative price. The latter 
result is equally straightforward; we saw above that domestic private 
income and spending in terms of the home good is invariant with re-
spect to a change in g, but we have seen just now that an increase in 
g will enable its producers to trade on better terms. 
An increase in net explicit taxes will worsen the home terms 
of trade, and reduce domestic disposable income 0 To interpret these 
results, note that the share of the domestic good in foreign aggre-
gate private spending, mw say, is necessarily zero--as a consequence 
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of our small country assumptiono Then the expression for d~*/dt is 
seen to be precisely that yielded by the barter theory of transfers. 
The explanation is that an increase in the explicit tax on the domestic 
private sector will induce a one-to-one diversion of income (in terms 
of the home good) from the home private sector to the rest of the world, 
and the resulting excess demand for the domestic good (recall m+m < 1) 
w 
requires a reduction in its relative price. Moreover, once we evaluate 
domestic disposable income in terms of its overall purchasing power, we 
find that the tax increase imposes a 'secondary burden' on the home 
private sector (the 'transferor"). 
Analogous considerations apply to the other comparative-static 
properties of a quasi equilibrium. First, domestic private wealth in 
terms of its overall domestic purchasing power,w~ may be seen from 
(2.2a)' and (2.llc)' to respond in the same way as domestic private in-
come, y *. 
Second, an increase in foreign inflation p will have effects on 
w 
the variables just examined which are qualitatively the same as those 
of an increase in t--providing the foreign real interest rate remains 
constant (i.e., if dr /dp = 1), and providing the domestic monetary 
w w 
base is partly domestic in source (i.e., if c > 0). On the other hand, 
these variables are invariant with respect to a change in p , accom-
w 
panied by no change in r , in the event that the domestic monetary base 
w 
is wholly foreign in source (i.eo, if c = 0, so that £ = f)o This is a 
straightforward consequence of our assumptions that international re-
serves earn market rates of interest and that interest earnings from 
reserves are rebated to the domestic private sector. 
Finally, an increase in p with dr /dp > ° will induce 
w w w 
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the domestic private sector to substitute money for bonds. The ana-
logy with increased monetary growth in a closed economy is not quite 
exact, because here the accommodating variable is the rate of foreign 
borrowing rather than domestic net explicit taxeso 
Long-Run Full Equilibrium 
The preceding subsection has revealed several reasons why the 
public sector of a small open economy will have an incentive to fi-
nance part of its legislated deficit by borrowing on the world's 
capital market. But we should also consider the time horizon over 
which a small country's borrowing power is limited. 
Analytically, a tractable way of incorporating this long-run 
constraint is to assume domestic explicit taxes vary as is necessary 
to ensure the cessation of aggregate debt creation in real per capita 
terms. Accordingly, replace equations (2.12)' by 
g - t* - (p + n)~ = 0 
w 
(2ol4a)W 
whence 
x* = 0 • (2.l4b)' 
That is, in long-run full equilibrium the public sector's budget and 
the nation's trade must balance. Section 5 below suggests one possible 
adjustment path for t. 
Instead of (2.l3a)' we now have 
dx* dv* 
- -dg dg 
d6* 
-- = 0 
-dg 
(2ol5a) ' 
Any increase in public spending must be wholly financed by explicit 
taxes. And instead of (2 ol3b)' we have 
dz* m = d[y*(~*) ] = -1 
, 
-
(2.l5b ) f 
-dg dg 
as in a closed economy0 
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Similarly, the full-equilibrium counterparts of (2ol3c)' are 
= 
m dy* = 
sen + 11 - 1) , 
'w dg 
(20l5c)1 
-dg 
Once again there are exact analogues of propositions in standard barte r 
theory (see, eogo, Mundell (1968, Part 1»0 The expression for d~*/dg 
is identical to its barter counterpart for the effect of a productivity 
decrease on the terms of tradeo The relevant story is also the same: 
in a stable market, a reduction in the amount of the home good avail-
able to the domestic private sector and the rest of the world will 
raise its relative price, provided that the other good is not a per-
feet substitute (~, \ < 00), and that there is trade at the margin 
(m > 0)0 And the expression for dy*/dg is identical to its barter 
counterpart for the effect of a productivity decrease on real income: 
in a stable market, a reduction in the amount of the home good avail-
able to the domestic private sector and the rest of the world will 
lower domestic private factor incomes in terms of the home good, but 
will also improve the terms on which the good is traded, so that there 
is an ambiguous movement of domestic private income in terms of its 
overall purchasing power. 
Turning to the other comparative-static properties of a full 
equilibrium, our remarks in the preceding subsection on the response 
of domestic private wealth continue to apply. The effects of an in-
crease in the foreign rate of inflation, accompanied by a matching 
increase in the foreign nominal interest rate and in the presence of 
a positive domestic source component exactly parallel those of an in-
crease in monetary growth in a closed economyo On the other hand, 
if the domestic monetary base is wholly foreign in source, then the 
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only domestic real effect of an increase in p (with dr !dp = 1) 
w w w 
is a one-to-one substitution by domestic residents of money for 
bonds 0 All other domestic real variables are invariant with re-
spect to this particular disturbance. 
50 STABILITY 
This section considers the local stability of the systemo As 
in the Chapter I counterpart of this section (cf. equations (1015)1), 
we reduce the dimensionality of the systemo Insert (Z03)1 into (Z.Za)', 
and (Z.Zd)f into (Zola)'; and recall (ZoZc)t, (Z05a)', (Z.5b)f and 
(Z.5c)'. This gives 
- - -m - -m - -m 
z = z + (l-s)[(q-t)cr + (r -TI)(w-ccr ) - TICcr - nw] - L(r -TI) + WW 
w w 
- " 1- 11 q = z+g+svP - mzcr 
p = y(q-q ) + TI F 
• - -m Sw<T'I\. 1- 11 w = ocr + - mzcr 
+ [r -(l-m)p-mp ](w_~cr-m) - [(l-m)p+mp ]ccr-m-nw 
w w w 
TI = f3[ (l-m)p + mp - TI] 
w 
a- = cr (p -p) 
w 
••• (Z .16a) t 
(Z .16b) 1 
(Zo16c)t 
(Z .16e ) , 
(Z.16f)' 
Equations (1.15)' describe a quasi equilibriumo The case of a full 
equilibrium (see Section 4) is dealt with below. 
Upon invoking the initial conditions (Z06)7 we obtain the 
characteristic polynomial 
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-A 0 0 0 0 -1 
0 - (A+,8) 0 0 0 ,8(l-m) 
~TT+-'fl.,-l) 0 -A -m 0 -w*(l-m) 
K(A) = 
0 
~(l-s ) [(l-s )w*- (,] -w 1 - (l-s) 0 
-~ttt'fl.,-l 0 0 - (l-m) 1 0 
0 -1 0 0 
-y 1 
Setting K(A) equal to zero gives 
A3 (1-h) 
2 2 
+ A [m[l3(l-h)+w] + (l-m) y[ww*+,8[(l-s)w*-{,] +Swy(ttt'fl.,-l-h)} 
2 2 
+ A[t:w[m +y(l-m) w*] +YSw[hw + (1+,8)(11 + 'fl., - 1 - h)]} 
+ I3Y~w (11 + " - 1) 
= 0 . 
The necessary and sufficient condition for stability is that the 
eigenvalues have real parts; i.e., that the coefficients of Ai, 
i=O,1,2,3 each be positive; and that the product of the coefficients 
3 0 2 1 
of A and A exceed the product of the coefficients of A and A • 
Focusing on the sign condition for stability, we see that there 
is little to add to th~ analysis of the budgetary regime in Chapter I, 
except for two considerations. First, it is no longer necessary for 
stability that the relevant inflation-tax base, w*, be positive. On 
the other hand, it is necessary that the Marshall-Lerner condition be 
satisfied, i.e., 11 + 'fl., - 1 > 0. 
In the case of perfect myopic foresight of the CPI inflation 
rate (13 - 00), the system reduces to a second-order differential equa-
tion. Given the Marshall-Lerner condition and the parameter 
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restrictions in the text, the necessary condition for instability 
turns out to be a positive response of private expenditure to a 
reduced real interest rate (L > 0), so that a vertical domestic IS 
curve (L = 0) is sufficient for stability. 
In the case of fixed inflation expectations ( ~ ~ 0), the sy-
stem again reduces to a second-order equationo Assuming h < 1, a suf-
ficient condition for stability is that the strong version of the 
Marshall-Lerner condition discussed in Section 3 be satisfied, ioeo, 
~ + ~ - (l+h) > O. To put this another way, for instability we re-
quire the horne good to be a Giffen good in domestic and foreign budgets. 
Finally, what can resaid about the stability of the real per 
capita stock of interest-bearing public debt issued by the domestic 
public sector, i.e., v-c? It is clear fr~ (2.4a)f and conditions 
(v=c) * (2.6)' that = 0 i.e., in the initial-steady state the vari-0 , 
able in question is stationaryo Recalling also (2ol2b)i, we conclude 
that (v-c) is only neutrally stable if both real per capita domestic 
credit, c, and net explicit taxes, t, are pegged. 
Towards the end of Section 4 we canvassed the possibility that 
net explicit taxes are endogenous, adjusting ' as is necessary to ensure 
the stationarity of v-co A point-in-time counterpart of that policy 
was not spelt out. One possibility is 
t = g + (r -p )(v-c) - p c - nv , 
w w w 
which meets our requirement that the domestic pub l i c sector eventua l l y 
adjusts its net explicit taxes as is necessary to ensure that it does 
not issue any new debt in real per capita terms. Under the initial 
conditions (2.6)' this yields 
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t = 0 
where the hat notation denotes the perturbed state of a variable. 
Hence the previous discussion of the stability of rr, TI, w, Z, q, and 
-p under t = t continues to applyo With regard to v, (204a)', (205c)' 
and (201 )' together imply 
v = v.ln(a-) 
so that v's trajectory is monotonically related to that of the inverse 
of the terms of trade. To put this another way, the domestic public 
sector issues (retires) debt according as whether its terms of trade 
are deteriorating (improving). 
In summary, there exists at least one policy rule which will 
drive the entire system to full equilibrium if and only if the system 
is stable in variables other than v (or v-c) under the quasi-
equilibrium regime. A single stability analysis is sufficient. 
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter has extended our closed-economy model to the case 
of a small economy, albeit with some monopoly power in the marke t for 
its exportable, under fixed exchange rates. Recognizing that our as-
sumption of perfect capital mobility implies the rest of the world 
effectively pegs the domestic nominal interest rate, most of thi s 
chapter has focused on a policy regime analogous to Chapter I ' s bud-
getary regime. On the other hand, recognizing that there is an 
'ultra-long' time horizon over which the domestic pub l ic sector ~s 
also obliged to relinquish control over its legislated deficit, this 
chapter has also considered a policy regime more akin to Chapter I ' s 
monetary regimeo The former regime was described a s a quasi 
63 
equilibrium (see Mundell (1968), Swoboda (1972) and Turnovsky (1977», 
and the latter was described as a full equilibrium, in which case 
legislated deficits can no longer be financed by foreign borrowingo 
The model can be viewed as a synthesis of Keynes-Phillips and 
international-monetary elements, and our short-run results reflect 
thato Here we wish to draw attention to two points. First, we have 
gone to some lengths to distinguish between private disposable income 
measured in terms of its purchasing power over the home good, and pri-
vate disposable income measured in terms of its overall purchasing 
power. Whereas this distinction is central to the standard barter 
theory of international trade, it is increasingly neglected in short-
run analyses--at the same time the wealth effects of devaluation have 
been receiving more attention. Second, compensating simplifications 
were gained from using the import share parameter to weight the do-
mestic CPI, and by confining attention to a highly specific initial 
state. 
In the long run, domestic rates of inflation are tied to the 
world rate. This is an elementary consequence of the small-country 
assumption, and purchasing power parity under fixed parities. It 
follows that domestic rates of inflation are invariant with respect 
to expansionary domestic policies. 
On the other hand, expansionary domestic policies will affect 
domestic private disposable income, in the long run as well as the 
short run. Besides being of interest in their awn right, these 
effects yield some insight into the reasons why national public sec-
tors may choose to implement expansionary policies. And if many 
small countries implement such policies, inflation rates may be 
64 
affected; see Chapter IVo Accordingly, it is worth highlighting the 
following results concerning the effects of expansionary domestic 
policies on domestic steady-state private disposable income: 
1. Under either quasi or full equilibrium, domestic steady-state 
private disposable income in terms of the home good is given 
by capacity output, plus the trade deficit in terms of the 
home good, minus the domestic public sector's purchases of the 
home good. It follows that expansionary domestic policy will 
raise private income in terms of overall purchasing power only 
if it improves the terms of trade or worsens the trade deficit. 
2. Under a quasi equilibrium, the public sector's spending multi-
plier with respect to private income in terms of overall pur-
chasing power is given by the inverse of the Marshall-Lerner 
criterion, that expression being the same here as its counter-
part in the standard barter model. Assuming stability, in which 
event the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (along with 
various closed-economy stability criteria), we conclude that 
increased public spending financed by foreign borrowing will 
raise private income in terms of overall purchasing power. 
3. Under a quasi equilibrium, the income effect of ~n income tax 
(financed by foreign lending) is precisely the same as that 
predicted by the barter model for the effect of a transfer of 
the home good by the domestic country to the rest of the worldo 
Hence domestic private income in terms of the home good will 
rise one-to-one with a reduction in explicit taxes. And do-
mestic private income in terms of overall purchasing power 
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must rise by more than that, since a tax cut financed by 
foreign borrowing will also improve the terms of trade o 
4. Under a full equilibrium, the income effect of an increase in 
public spending on the home good is precisely the same as that 
predicted by the barter model for the effect of a productivity 
decline at home (rimmdserizing growth r and all that)o Hence 
domestic private income in terms of the home good will decline 
one-to-one with an increase in domestic public spending. But 
the movement in domestic private income in terms of overall 
purchasing power is not necessarily negative, for even a tax-
financed increase in public spending will improve the terms 
of trade, albeit to a lesser extent than a spending increase 
financed by borrowing abroad. 
CHAPTER III 
INFLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN A SMALL ECONOMY 
UNDER FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATESI 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We have seen that the theoretical literature on inflation and 
public policy in a small economy under fixed exchange rates splits 
into three parts: the Keynes-Phillips approach, the monetary approach, 
and an eclectic approach based on synthesis of the other two. This 
classification could also serve for the case of a small economy under 
flexible rates. However it is more convenient to organize these intro-
ductory comments by focusing on the question of price anticipations--
especially the anticipated price of foreign currency. 
The traditional Keynes-Phillips model is based on the assump-
tion of static price expectations, meaning that the domestic-currency 
prices of foreign currency, domestic output and foreign output are all 
expected to be constant. This is true, for example, of the Fleming-
2 Mundell model; see, Fleming (1962), Mundell (1968, Ch. 17). Yet in 
the case of exchange-rate anticipations alone, intuition and evidence 
both suggest that in the absence of a credible commitment by national 
public sectors to fixed parities, the forward rate will be highly sen-
sitive to current economic disturbances; for evidence, see, e.g., 
Black (1973). 
The difficulties with static exchange-rate expectations are 
brought to the fore when we consider this assumption in conjunction 
with perfect capital mobility. With predetermined commodity prices, 
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domestic monetary expansion is able to shift the exchange rate only 
by shifting domestic output in the first instance. But monetary 
disturbances probably affect the spot rate much more promptly than 
thato 
Several recent papers have resolved this problem by postulating 
that exchange-rate expectations are regressiveo This general hypo-
thesis has two variants at present. One postulates that the antici-
pated rate of exchange depreciation is negatively related to the gap 
between the exogenously-given fnormal' level of both the forward and 
spot rate, and the current spot rate; :see, e.g., Argy and Porter 
(1972), Dornbusch (1976a,b), and Girton and Henderson (1976a), (1977). 
With conventional specifications of money demand (either with or 
without a 'wealth' demand for money), and regardless of whether or not 
output rates are taken to be predetermined, money supply shocks will 
influence the spot rate. 
The other variant is due to Dornbusch (1976c). The distinguish-
ing feature of his expectational scheme is that the fnormal' rate is 
equated to its steady-state solution value, where that solution is 
implicit in a simple general-equilibrium model whose steady state has 
the standard neutrality properties. Again, monetary shocks influence 
the spot rate regardless of whether or not output is predetermined. 
Indeed, the model necessarily exhibits the much-discussed 'over-
shootingf phenomenon: a 1 percent expansion of the nominal domestic 
money supply that was previously unforeseen but is expected to persist 
will depreciate the spot rate by more than 1 percent in the short run 
(and by precisely 1 percent in the long run). 
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Another interesting proposition yielded by the Dornbusch 
model concerns the insulating properties of flexible rateso A 1 per-
cent increase in the foreign-currency price of imports will appreciate 
the spot rate by precisely 1 percent in both the short run and the 
long, so that domestic real variables are fully insulated against 
this particular disturbanceo 
From the standpoint of explaining a sustained inflation, how-
ever, either version of the regressive hypothesis is subject to a 
critical limitation. Each proceeds in terms of levels of the nominal 
domestic money supply and the prices of foreign currency and -. 
output. Accordingly, Turnovsky and Kingston (1977) proceeded in terms 
of the percentage rates of change of prices, exchange rates, and money 
supplies, rather than in terms of the levels of those variables. That 
paper dealt with the expectations issue by assuIllng perfect myopic 
foresight of all variables, including the exchange depreciation rateo 
This hypothesis has several desirable features. First, it is 
simple. Second, it is the continuous deterministic analogue of ra-
tional expectations, so that participants in the foreign exchange mar-
ket are assumed not to make systematic forecasting errors. This is 
an advantage because the econometric evidence currently available on 
foreign exchange markets favours the hypothesis of efficiency in for-
eign exchange markets (see, e.g., Magee (1976)). Third, it permits 
the condition for stock equilibrium in the money market to playa proxi-
mate role in exchange-rate determination, which is also in line with 
current theory and tests (see, e.go, Magee (1976) and Girton and Roper 
(1977)). 
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On the other hand, several difficulties stem from the specifi-
cation of anticipations in the Turnovsky-Kingston modelo First, some 
of the results are counter-intuitiveo For example, an increase in the 
rate of domestic monetary growth does not immediately raise the ex-
change depreciation rate; instead, it will temporarily exert pressure 
in the reverse directiono (In the long run, of course, a 1 percent in-
crease in the domestic monetary growth rate will raise the domestic 
exchange depreciation rate by I percento) This short-run result is a 
direct consequence of the fact that, given interest rate parity and 
perfect myopic foresight, the rate of exchange depreciation is directly 
analogous to the domestic nominal interest rate and therefore responds 
negatively to a monetary expansion. Second, the stability of the model 
is far from assured. This is not surprising, since the assumption of 
perfect myopic foresight typically introduces saddlepoint instabilities 
into financial markets and thence into complete systems in which they 
are embedded; Chapter I above discusses this problem in the context of 
a closed economy, and Kouri (1976) and Gray and Turnovsky (1978) pursue 
the topic in the context of a small open economy under flexible rateso 
Third, in Chapter I it was noted that the assumption of rational 
inflation expectations has never been very convincingly supported by 
empirical evidence. In particular, postwar United States data 
currently seem to favour the traditional autoregressive explanation 
of inflation expectations. 
In the light of these considerations, and noting that the 
Dornbusch (1976c) variant of the regressive hypothesis can, in a 
sense, be reconciled with the perfect foresight hypothesis (more on 
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this below), the remainder of this chapter considers a small economy 
under flexible exchange rates, adaptive inflation expectations, and a 
modification of the Dornbusch hypothesis which permits secular differ-
ences in national monetary growth and inflation rates along with the 
possibility of sustained revenue gains to national public sectors from 
expansionary policyo Section 2 sets out the modelo Although this 
facilitates comparison with the preceding chapters, the complete model 
turns out to have a degree of complexity which does not repay analysis 
of its transients 0 Accordingly, Section 3 considers the short-run and 
inter-run responses of domestic inflation and exchange-depreciation 
rates, to increased domestic monetary growth and foreign price growth, 
in the special case of fixed real per capita domestic output. 
Sections 4 and 5 deal vnth the long run, in which case anticipa-
tions are relevant only insofar as they affect the model's stability. 
Section 4 considers the long-run response of the domestic real economy 
to expansionary domestic policies. The emphasis there is on analogies 
to the barter model in the contex t of both quasi and full equilibria 
(see Chapter II). Section 5 considers the question of the optimal rate 
of exchange depreciation, that question having originally been ~aised by 
Mathieson (1976). We shall find that an analogue to the standard theory 
of the closed-economy inflation tax (see Chapter I) readily presents 
itself. 
2. THE MODEL 
Assumptions 
The Chapter II model requires augmentation in two respects. 
First, if the domestic public sector no longer pegs the exchange rate, 
what alternative monetary norm should we postulate? Second (and this 
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is related to the first point) now we must spell out the above-
mentioned modification of the Dornbusch expectational hypothesis to 
conditions of sustained inflation and monetary growtho 
With regard to the first pOint, it is natural to assume that 
the domestic public sector pegs either the domestic nominal interest 
rate or the rate of growth of the domestic nominal monetary base--if 
only to enable useful comparisons with the preceding chapters. In the 
context of our simple model this rules out a regime of -dirty floating--
see, e.g., Girton and Roper (1977) for an analysis which encompasses 
that case. Additionally, the case of a pegged domestic nominal inter-
est rate in conjunction with perfect capital mobility and perfect 
myopic foresight of the exchange depreciation rate essentially takes 
us back to the case of a small economy under fixed rates. In symbols: 
-
r = rand r = r + e, whence e = r - r = e. Finally, we have not 
w w 
been able to discover any appealing specifications of regressive 
exchange-rate expectations in conjunction with a pegged nominal inter-
est rate. This leaves the case of a pegged rate of nominal monetary 
growth which, accordingly, is assumed everywhere in this chapter, ex-
cept Section 4--for reasons which will become apparent thereino 
Turning to the question of exchange-rate anticipations, the 
Dornbusch hypothesis is given by 8 = e(ln E* - In E), where 8 is the 
anticipated rate of inflation ot the price of foreign exchange, and 
9 is an adjustment coefficient, taken to be a positive cons tanto 
Our approach is first to differentiate the above with respect to 
time, yielding 8 = e(e* - e); and then to note that e* has an explicit 
representation in terms of exogenous variables and parameters in the 
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present case, since the policy assumption ~ = ~, and the long-run 
equilibrium relationship e* = ~* - n - p (see below), together imply 
w 
e* = ~ - n - p 0 
w 
It follows that e = e(~ - n - Pw - e), or, the absolute rate 
of change of the anticipated rate of exchange depreciation is propor-
tional to the gap between the exogenously-given rate of domestic mone-
tary expansion (less domestic real output growth) and the rate of in-
flation of the domestic-currency price of imports. 
The Model 
Consider first the static relationships 
-q=z+g+x 
z = z + (l-s)y - t,(r + e - TT) + ww 
w 
\ 1-11 
x = Swer - mzer 
- -m -m-m y = (q-t)er + (r +e-TT)(w-cer ) - TICer - nw 
w 
c = kq¢ exp[- a (r + e)] 
w 
p = y(q - qF) + TT 
Pd - (l-m)p + m(pw + e) • 
(3.la)f 
(3.lb) f 
(3.lc)f 
(3.ld)t 
(3.le)t 
(3.lf) t 
(3.lg)t 
In the light of the preceding chapters, these relationships 
require no further explanation, although it might be worth noting that 
(3.le)f incorporates the assumption that at some stage in the past the 
domestic public sector has dissipated its foreign assets--whence 
f = 0, in addition to f = 0, so that t = c. 
Consider next the dynamic relationships 
• - -m -m-m 
w = (6+x)er + (rw~e-Pd)(w-c er ) - Pdc~ - (e-e)mw - nw 
-IT = f3 (Pd - n) 
rr - IT (p + e - p) 
w 
(3.2a)' 
(3.2b) I 
(3.2c)' 
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. c(~ p) (3.2d) t c = - n -
-• p)(v -v = o + (r + 8 - C) - pC - nv (302e)t w 
.. 
8 = e(~ - n - p - e) • (3.2f) t w 
Again, previous explanations obviate the need for detailed 
discussion of these relationships, although note that the capital-
loss item (8 - e)mw in (3.2a)'is a consequence of our assumption of 
initially 'covered' domestic portfolios (see Chapter II) and the fact 
that the ex post domestic return on the interest-bearing debt of the 
domestic public sector in terms of overall domestic purchasing power 
is r - Pd (= rw + e - Pd)' whereas the ex post domestic return on the 
interest-bearing debt of the foreign public sector is rw + e - Pd. 
Consider finally the conditions 
~o = 0 = 0 0 
110 +n = Po + n = Pw + n = 0 
po - n = Pw - n = 0 (3.3) , 0 
t - k 
0 
CT = E = 1 • 0 0 
where p == r + 8 - 11· The interpretations of these conditions 
o woo 
are straightforward and can be found in Chapters I and II. 
In summary, there are thirteen equations, (3.l)t and (3.2)'; 
thirteen endogenous variables, q, z, x, y, 8, 11, W, CT , c, p, Pd' e 
and v; and thirteen nominal counterparts of those variables which in 
principle can be determined at any time (whether or not the 
system is perturbed) by reference to the aforemention equations in 
conjunction with the conditions (3.3)'. It is expositionally 
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convenient to proceed directly to the model's long-run equilibrium 
relationships. 
Long-Run Equilibrium Relationships 
The following steady-state equations are straightforward con-
sequences of equations (3.1)' and (3.2)': 
* p* - Pc = TT* = Pw + e* (3.4a)' 
p* 
- r* + e* - TT* = r - Pw - Pw (3.4b) , w 
q* = qF (3.4c) , 
0 
~ - (W/W) * - Pw + e* + n (3. 4d) Y 
z* = q -F g x* (3. 4e) , 
-m (3.4f) , y* = z*(cr*) 
e* = 8* (3.4g) , 
In view of the discussion in the Chapter II counterpart of this 
section, equations (3.4)' warrant just two comments. First, domestic 
steady-state rates of commodity price inflation are tied down by the 
gap between domestic nominal monetary growth and world real output 
growth--not by the rate of inflation of the foreign-currency price of 
imports. Second, the rate of inflation of the price of foreign ex-
change (whose anticipated and actual values coincide in the steady 
state) is given by domestic nominal monetary growth less the sum of 
world nominal price growth (in terms of foreign currency) and world 
real output growth, so that the domestic nominal interest rate will 
exceed the world rate by the amount just stated. 
7S 
3. FIXED OUTPUT 
If output is predetermined at capacity (q = qF)' then the 
model can be reduced to two recursive submodels. The first describes 
the dynamics of the rates of inflation of the domestic-currency prices 
of domestic output, living costs, and foreign exchange, together with 
their respective expectations. The second describes the dynamics of 
interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing public debt, and the evolu-
tion of the terms of trade. Attention is focused on the former, given 
by: 
• 
~ - p + n - ae (3.Sa)' 
p = iT (3. Sb) , 
• 
e = e(~ - n - Pw - e) (3. Sc) , 
TI = t3[ (l-m)p + m(p + e) - TT] • 
. w 
(3. Sd) , 
Equation (3.Sa)t is obtained by differentiating (30Ie)t with respect 
to time and using (3.2d)f to eliminate c. Equation (3oSb)r is (301f)f 
in the special case q = qF. Equation (3 oSC)f merely reproduces (302f)f, 
and (3oSd)1 is obtained by substituting for Pd in (3.2b)t 
This subsystem can be viewed as an finflation' analogue of the 
Dornbusch (1976c) model. As well as requiring q = qF' its simple 
structure is also a consequence of our assumption of no rwealthl de-
mand for money. If this latter assumption is dropped, then the system 
can no longer be dealt with in a simple recursive fashion. 
By eliminating p and e the submodel can be reduced to one in 
e and TT only: 
e = 
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1 -(1 + -) (~ - n) - Pw ae 
-IT = m t3(p + e - TT) • 
w 
TT 
- -cxa (3.6a)' 
(3.6b) f 
Providing inflation expectations adjust sluggishly, (306~i can be 
viewed as a reduced-form equationo Accordingly, we can read off the 
impacts of various disturbances on the rate of exchange depreciation, 
and apply the results to the rate of inflation of domestic living 
Comparative Statics 
Consider first the impacts of increased domestic monetary 
growth 
de 1 +L = 
- ae d~ 
(3.7a)f 
dPd 
m(l +L) = 
• 
- cxe d~ 
(3.7b)t 
The result (3.7a)1 shows that a 1 percent increase in domestic 
monetary growth, that was previously unforeseen but is expected to 
persist once it occurs, will raise the actual rate of exchange depreci-
ation by more than 1 percent in the short run. Allowing for the fact 
that working in terms of rates of change rather than levels, the ana-
logy with Dornbusch (1976c) readily presents itself. an our notation 
the relevant Dornbusch result is d(tn E)/d(tn C) = 1 + l/cxe .) A 1 
percent monetary expansion exerts downward pressure on the domestic 
interest rate, and generates expectations of an increased rate of ex-
change depreciation in the long run. To compensate for the imminent 
reduction in the domestic interest rate, the instantaneous increase 
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in the exchange depreciation rate must exceed the long-run increase; 
otherwise interest rate parity cannot hold on the path to long-run 
equilibrium. 
A high interest elasticity of demand for real balances and 
fast adjustment of exchange-depreciation expectations are both dampen-
ing influences. Thus, the disturbance in question will raise the rate 
of inflation of the CPI by more or less than 1 percent according as 
whether 
< m 
QB>-l ' 
-m 
where the expression on the right-hand side is evidently an index of 
the openness of the domestic economy to trade in goods and services. 
Consider next the foreign inflation impacts. Differentiation 
of (3.6a)f and Pd with respect to Pw yields 
de 
- = - 1 dp 
w 
= 0 
(3. 8a) f 
(3.8b)' 
A 1 percent increase in foreign price growth will lower the short-run 
exchange depreciation rate by exactly 1 percent. In consequence, the 
domestic CPI inflation rate will remain the same. Note that these 
results obtain regardless of whether or not there is a matching in-
crease in the foreign nominal interest rate (i 0 eo, dr /dp = 1). w w 
This is due to the recursive nature of the present model. Thus, the 
steady state of the more general model set out in Section 2 has this 
insulation property only if the foreign real interest rate remains 
unchanged (i.e., dr /dp = 1)0 Moreover, its point-in-time state w w 
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has this property only if there is also a matching movement in the 
anticipated exchange depreciation rate (ioeo, de/dp = de/dp ). 
w w 
Whether or not the present model and its Section 2 counterpart 
satisfy this condition is a moot point which is examined in more 
detail belowo 
Dynamics 
The remainder of this section is concerned with the behaviour 
over time of anticipated CPI inflation, and the actual rates of infla-
tion of the price of domestic output and foreign exchangeo First we 
focus on the time paths associated with constant rates of domestic 
monetary growth and foreign price growth; then we reconsider the 
effects of an increase in domestic monetary growth. 
Beginning with the anticipated rate of CPI inflation, (3.6a)f 
into (306b)' yields 
• l-
11 = f3 m(l + -)(~ - n - 11). (3.9a)' 
ae 
Evidently the present model is stable. The general adjustment speed 
-
of inflation expectations to the equilibrium ~ - n = 11* is given by 
the product of the partial adjustment speed f3 and the impact multi-
plier dPd/d~o And with p = 11 (recall (3oSb)f), identical considera-
tions apply to the actual rate of inflation of the domestic-currency 
price of foreign output. 
Consider now the anticipated and actual rates of exchange de-
preciationo In the former case, use (306a)' to eliminate e from 
(3oSc)'; and in the latter case differentiate (3.6a)f with respect 
to time, permi t ti ng only 11 to vary, and then use (3. 9a)' to 
79 
eliminate TIo This yields 
• 
€ = 
. 
e = 
1 --(~ - n - TT) CX 
p. m 1-~(l + -)(~ - n - TT)o 
CX 8 a8 (309c)' 
A necessary condition for perfect foresight expectations is 
that the anticipated exchange depreciation rate converges to equili-
brium at the same rate as its ex post counterpart 0 The above 
pair of equations imply that this condition is satisfied if and only 
if 
that is 
1 8--=0, 
CX 
8 = !3 m(l ± j 1: +~. ). ) 4 cx!3m 
Assuming the Cagan condition is satisfied (i.e., cx!3 < 1), then the 
two solutions for 8 will be opposite in sign, so that there is only 
one positive solution consistent with perfect foresight anticipations: 
e = ~ m(l + j 10 + ~ ). 4 CX!3m 
There is a diagram which illustrates most of the points made 
in this section--and also draws attention to a difficulty with the 
foregoing notion of "consistent" expectations. Figure 1 Vs horizontal 
axis shows time. Its vertical axis shows the percentage rates of 
change of the domestic nominal monetary base, the anticipated domestic 
CPI, the actual domestic-currency price of home output, the spot price 
of foreign currency, and the actual domestic CPl. Assume that prior 
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to time T , the system is in steady-state equilibrium, with n = 0 
o 
for simplicity, and that the initial conditions (303)1 are satis-
fied o At time T the domestic monetary growth rate jumps to I per-
o 
cent, and thereafter remains at that rateo 
Percentage 
rates of 
change 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t 
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FIGURE I 
Transitory Effects of Increased Domestic Monetary 
Growth in a Small Economy Under Flexible Exchange Rates 
Time 
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Under the assumption that inflation anticipates adjust slug-
gish1y, the anticipated domestic CPI inflation rate, TI, does not jump 
at time T 0 Figure 1 depicts the monotonic convergence of inflation 
o 
expectations to the new, higher rate of domestic monetary growtho 
And with output fixed at capacity, the trajectory of the rate of in-
flation of the actual domestic-currency price of home output, p, is 
the same. 
The initial jump in the actual exchange depreciation rate, e, 
is given by (3.7a)', and its subsequent time path may be deduced from 
(3.9c)'. Again there is monotonic convergence to the new rate of 
domestic monetary growth. 
The initial jump in the actual domestic CPI inflation rate, Pd' 
is given by (3.7b)'. Figure 1 illustrates the case of undershooting 
(dPd/d~ < 1), although we cannot rule out the possibility of over-
shooting (dPd/d~ > 1). The subsequent time path of Pd is evidently a 
weighted average of the paths of p and e (see above), and is easily 
deduced from that consideration. 
Finally, conspicuous by its absence from the diagram is the 
trajectory of the anticipated exchange depreciation rate, €. The 
reason for this omission is as follows. To determine the behaviour 
of € subsequent to time,. is straightforward; its general path may 
o 
be deduced from (3.9b)', and its path in the special case of 
"consistent expectations" (see Dornbusch (1976c) and above) may be 
deduced from (3.9c)'o On the other hand, focusing on the case of 
consistent expectations, we also require a jump in€ , of magnitude 
1 + l/a e, at time T. But the model lacks the formal analytical 
o 
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contrivance necessary to ensure this outcome 0 Indeed, the money 
market condition (305a)f, and the methodology we have used hitherto, 
together suggest that the anticipated exchange depreciation rate 
adjusts sluggishly--in which event its trajectory subsequent to T 
o 
would be below the horizontal axis of Figure 1. That adjustment path 
is clearly implausible. 
The Dornbusch (1976c) model would appear to give rise to essen-
tially the same problem; in that model it is the level of the forward 
rate (rather than its percentage rate of change) which should jump at 
the instant a monetary expansion takes place. One way out of this 
difficulty is to postulate rational exchange-rate expectations to-
gether with a terminal condition on real money balances--a la Sargent 
and Wallace (1973). This is done by Gray and Turnovsky (1978), who 
show that the initial jump is again 1 + lias. 
4. COMPARISON WITH THE BARTER MODEL 
The most novel aspect of our analysis of the fixed-rate case 
is undoubtedly that concerning analogies to the barter theory of in-
ternational trade. This section investigates whether the parallels 
pointed out there carryover to the flexible-rates case. As in 
Chapterrr, we distinguish between quasi and full long-run equilibrium, 
and consider those cases in turn. 
Long-Run Quasi Equilibrium 
Noting equations (303)f. and assuming the exogenously-given 
foreign real interest rate takes its golden-rule value (cf. equations 
(2.l2)f), equations (3.2a)f and (3.2e)f imply 
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- -
-x* = 0 - ~* (3 0 lOa) r 
- -v* = 0 - ~* (30 lOb) r 
These equations parallel their fixed-rates counterparts (2012)', 
and our detailed comments on those equations apply here as wello But 
the analogy is not exact for two reasons. First, the relevant 
inflation-cum-growth tax rate is ~(= p + n + e*), not p + n. 
w w 
-Second, the relevant inflation-cum-growth tax base is c* , not c. 
Since 
c * = kq ¢ exp (- ex ~) 
F 
when the foreign interest rate conforms to the golden rule, it follows 
that the domestic public sector also indirectly controls the rele-
vant inflation-tax base in the present case, although there is a well-
known upper bound on the amount of revenue that can be raised; see 
next section. 
The comparative statics of increased public spending and net 
explicit taxes are precisely the same as in the fixed-rate case (cf. 
equations (2.13),):3 
dx* dv* 1 =-- = 
- -dg dg 
dx* dv* 
-1 =- = 
- -dt dt 
dz* 
-
m d [y*( cr*) ] 
-
- -dg dg 
dz* m d [y*( cr*) ] 
- = 
- -dt dt 
dCT* 1 
- -
- ~11 + \ -dg 
dCT* 1 - m 
= --------------SJ11 + \ - 1) -dt 
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0 
-1 
dy* 
1) , 
-dg 
, 
-dt 
1 
- 11+ 
'f\v - 1 
1 - m 
= - 1 - 11 + \ - 1 
(3.11)1 
• 
The interpretation of these results is the same as given in connection 
with equations (2.13)'. 
An increase in domestic monetary growth ~ will raise or lower 
the receipts of the domestic public sector from the inflation-cum-
growth tax on its noninterest-bearing debt according as whether the 
monetary growth at the margin is below or above its revenue-maximising 
rate; see below. Accordingly, the effects on the terms of 
trade, and domestic private income in terms of its overall purchasing 
power, are qualitatively the same as an increase or decrease in net 
explicit taxes, depending on the margin just mentioned. 
This story is not quite the same as that given in connection 
with an increase in Pw under fixed rates; see Chapter IL The dif-
ference can be viewed as a consequence of our specification of do-
mestic public sector policy in the fixed-rate case. If, for example, the 
85 
assumptions were that reserves are invested in noninterest-bearing 
assets, and that the domestic source component varies so as to en-
sure that reserves comprise a constant fraction of the domestic mone-
tary base, then essentially the same explanation would suffice for 
either exchange-rate regimeo 
Long-Run Full Equilibrium 
We analyzed long-run full equilibrium in the fixed-rates 
counterpart of this section by postulating that real per capita pub- . 
lic spending is pegged and that net explicit taxes adjust endogenously 
as required to ensure the cessation of net foreign borrowing. This sub-
section takes another look at this case. But in the light of our ana-
lysis of the tmonetaryt regime in a closed economy, and especially 
the preceding subsection, it is not difficult to foresee that our 
flexible-rates analysis of this case will contain few surprises. 
On the other hand, there is an alternative policy regime which 
ensures long-run full equilibrium, and also says something new 
about the tbudgetaryt view of the causes and consequences of infla-
tion (see Chapter I). Specifically, we introduce the case whereby 
real per capita public spending and net explicit taxes are pegged, 
and nominal monetary growth adjusts endogenously as is necessary to 
ensure the cessation of net foreign borrowing. 
In the case of endogenous net explicit taxes and exogenous 
monetary growth there is, instead of equations (3.10)', 
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sure that reserves comprise a constant fraction of the domestic mone-
tary base, then essentially the same explanation would suffice for 
either exchange-rate regimeo 
Long-Run Full Equilibrium 
We analyzed long-run full equilibrium in the fixed-rates 
counterpart of this section by postulating that real per capita pub- . 
lic spending is pegged and that net explicit taxes adjust endogenously 
as required to ensure the cessation of net foreign borrowing. This sub-
section takes another look at this case. But in the light of our ana-
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the preceding subsection, it is not difficult to foresee that our 
flexible-rates analysis of this case will contain few surprises. 
On the other hand, there is an alternative policy regime which 
ensures long-run full equilibrium, and also says something new 
about the tbudgetaryt view of the causes and consequences of infla-
tion (see Chapter I). Specifically, we introduce the case whereby 
real per capita public spending and net explicit taxes are pegged, 
and nominal monetary growth adjusts endogenously as is necessary to 
ensure the cessation of net foreign borrowing. 
In the case of endogenous net explicit taxes and exogenous 
monetary growth there is, instead of equations (3.10)1, 
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g - t* - ~kq~(- a~) = 0 
whence 
x* = 0 0 (3.l2b) r 
That is, in long-run full equilibrium the public sectoris budget and 
the nationfs trade must balance--cfo equations (2.14)'0 
4 Instead of (3.11)2 we now have: 
dx* 
-dg 
dz* 
-dg 
-dg 
de.!. do* v,.. 0 - -- --- -
- -dg dg 
m d [y*(cr*) ] 
-1 = -
-dg 
m 
= ~11 + 1\., - 1) , 
dy* _ 
dg 
m 
- 1 + ----------11 + 11.: - 1 
o 
These equations are the same as their fixed-rates counterparts (2.l5)t~ 
Accordingly, they require no further cOmm£nt. 
In the case of exogenous net explicit taxes and endogenous 
monetary growth, on the other hand, 
g - t - ~"\'kq¢ (- a~'k) = 0 F , 
and allowing ~* to take any positive value, 
d~* de* dTT* 1 
- -- --- = 
- - - c'k(l - Ctr*) do do do 
To interpret (3.l5)t, recall two of the key Chapter I results. 
Specifically, in the case of the budgetary regime, d~*/d6 = dn*/d6 = 
l/w*; and in the case of the monetary regime, do*/d~ =c*(l - Ctr*). 
Equations (3.15)' can be viewed as a hybrid of these two results: 
monetary growth is endogenous, as in the budgetary approach; and the 
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real interest rate is tied to its exogenously-given golden-rule rate, 
as in the monetary approach. 
The upshot is that an increase in the legislated deficit is 
inflationary or deflationary according as whether monetary growth, 
at the margin, is below or above its revenue-maximizing rate. In 
- > < 
symbols, drr*/d6 < 0 according as whether ~* > l/a. In the former 
case, and providing the domestic private sector is holding some 
interest-bearing public debt, a unit increase in the legislated de-
ficit is always more inflationary than when the nominal interest 
rate is pegged, because the required increase in inflation-tax 
revenues must be generated from a narrower base. To put this an-
other way, in the present case the domestic public sector is unable 
to improve the real terms on which it trades its interest-bearing 
public debt. It must accept the exogenously-given global real rate 
of interesto 
Even in a closed economy there are a variety of assets (apart 
from money) which compete with interest-bearing public debt, and 
thereby limiting the public sectorts scope for squeezing the real rate 
of return on its interest-bearing debt. Chqpter Its analysis of the 
budgetary approach abstracted from such effectso The present analysis 
therefore provides a salutary reminder of the long-run limits on the 
inflation-tax base available to the public sectoro On the other hand, 
the present analysis disregards important existence and stability 
issues. These are taken up in Chapter IVo 
As a final observation on the policy regime in question, 
note that insofar as an increase in the legislated deficit is effected 
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by higher public spending, equations (3.13)1 continue to hold; 
whereas an increase in the legislated deficit which is effected 
wholly by reduced net explicit taxes will have no effect on the terms 
of trade and disposable income 0 
50 IS THERE AN OPTIMAL CRAWL? 
This section applies some elements of the analysis in this and 
preceding chapters, and also some standard evidence on the demand for 
money, to a claim by Mathieson (1976) concerning the optimal secular 
rate of exchange depreciation, or Itcrawlft. Mathieson argues that the 
crawl which induces a unitary interest elasticity of money demand will 
maximize domestic private consumption. We shall argue that the unit-
elasticity crawl will minimize domestic private consumption, and that 
that crawl in question represents a straightforward application of 
the standard theory of the inflation tax in a closed economy (see 
Chapter I) to the case of a small open economy under flexible rates. 
We also draw attention to other aspects of the unit-elasticity crawl, 
but the two foregoing points are the main ones. 
Mathieson1s model diverges from the steady-state counterpart 
of our Section 2 model in four noteworthy respects. First, it assumes 
perfect goods-market integration, so that the terms of trade are fixed. 
Second, it abstracts from real-interest and wealth effects in the 
spending-saving choice, although this turns out to be unimportant in 
the present context. Third, the growth tax on domestic private hold-
ings of aggregate public debt, nw, appear in the wealth accumulation 
equation rather than in the definition of private disposable income. 
We prefer the latter alternative for several reasons; for example, 
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it ensures that long-run full-equilibrium private disposable income 
is given by long-run full-equilibrium private spending, which seems 
a desirable property in the context of zero productivity growtho 
Again, however, this turns out to be unimportant in the present con-
texto Fourth the domestic public sector raises no explicit taxeso 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the key steady-
state relationship in Mathieson's paper (poI89; Mathieson's notation): 
de 
-de 
(l-s)n[m + L'y(i*+e)] • 
n - s (i * - TT* ) 
This relationship is a straightforward implication of the following 
notations, definitions, and assumptions: 
e - (l-s)YD = real per capita private spending, 
e = rate of crawl, taken to be pegged, 
s = marginal propensity to save, a constant, 
Yn - y + i(w-m) - TIW = private disposable income, 
y = real per capita output, taken to be exogenous, 
• oJ- i e = foreign nominal interest rate, taken to be exogenous, ~'" 
-
-
w = f(sYn - nw) = -real per capita private wealth, 
-
TT = TT* + e = inflation rate, 
TT* = foreign inflation rate, taken to be exogenous, 
m = L(i)y = ~upply of real per capita money balances, 
n = world rate of population growth, a constant, 
L(i)y = per capita demand for balances, with L' = dL/dio 
All these variables refer to the domestic economy unless specifically 
indicated to the contrary. 
It follows directly that 
de 
= 0 ~ x = -1 , 
-de 
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where x - (i* + e)L'/L = elasticity of demand for real balances with 
respect to the nominal interest rate, 
and that 
e* = -i* - L/Lt 
where e* is the rate of crawl which induces a unitary interest elas-
ticity of money demand. 
The crucial issue is that nature of the turning point associ-
ated with X= -1. Mathieson argues (p. 129, n.lS): 
"We can show that the optimal crawl [e.,J maximizes 
ox 
rather than minimizes consumption. Given the solu-
- 2 -2 tion for de/de, we will have de/de = 
- (1- s )ny (2L' + L" (i i-.-+~» / (n - s (i *-TT*». 
If n > S(i*-TT*) (which is likely to be true in a 
Golden Rule world where i* - TT* = the 'real l inter-
2 -2 
est rate ~ n), then de/de < 0 if 
2L' + L"(i~*) > O. Since e* = i* - L/Lt we can 
2 -2 
rewrite the condition for d L/de < 0 as 
2L' - LltL/L' > 0." 
Now if X = - 1, 
.Qx 2L' + L"(i* + e*) 
= di L • 
-
Hence 2L f + Lit (i * + e*) > 0 only if dX/di > O. But there is strong 
evidence that the interest elasticity of demand for real bal-
ances is a non-increasing function of the nominal interest rate 
(i • e., Crx!di ~ 0). 
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What is the evidence from episodes of rapid inflation? First, 
a preliminaryo Investigators of rapid inflations have measured the 
opportunity cost of holding real money balances by the expected in-
flation rate rather than by the nominal interest rate. But if 
(following Mathieson and others) one assumes the expected real in-
terest rate is constant, then the response of the interest elas-
ticity of demand for money to an increase in the nominal interest 
rate will have the same sign as the response of the inflation elas-
ticity of demand for money to an increase in the (expected) infla-
tion rate. To put this another way, assume i - n is constant, recall 
that X S (i!m)(dm!di), and introduce X = (n!m)(dm!dn). Then 
~ ~ dx!di < 0 according as whether ~!dn < O. Indeed, it is well known 
that there is only a negligible loss of accuracy if one chooses to 
use X and ~ interchangeably in conditions of rapid inflation. 
The classic reference on the demand for money during rapid in-
flations is Cagan (1956). He obtained good results with the semi-
"" ,....., ~,....., logarithmic functional form m = K exp(- an), where k and a are posi-
tive constants. If this specification is correct--and numerous subse-
quent investigations have supported Cagan's basic findings--then 
dx!di < O. And following the pioneering work of Cagan, the semi-
logarithmic functional form has become dominant in the literature on 
the inflation tax. 
The demand for money during the hyperinflation "in 
Weimar Germany has been painstakingly re-examined by Frenkel (1977). 
One aspect of his study is especially relevant, namely, his Box-Cox 
estimate of A in the function 
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A 
1 A + A (TT - 1) + og m = 1-'0 1-'1 A u!l U = error term • 
Equation (7) is especially relevant because it is consistent with 
I"'J ~ ~_ ~ x < 0 together with each of the three cases UX/UTI < 00 It turns out 
that A ~ 1 is the best estimate by most criteria, although the esti-
mate A ~ 0 has some merito The case A = 1 takes us back to the semi-
logarithmic specification; see above. The case A - 0, on the other 
hand, corresponds to the double-logarithmic specification 
,...., ~ ,...,.,,....,,, 
log m = Y + XTT, where y and X are constantso If this form is correct, 
then CX/CTT = O. Since X < 0 and dX/2m > 0 are both true only if 
A < 0, it is pertinent that Frenkel apparently finds no support for 
the hypothesis A < O. 
What is the relevant evidence from periods of moderate infla-
tion? The semilogarithmic form has again yielded good results. Thus, 
for example, Girton and Roper (1977) recently obtained such results 
wi th m = k exp (- ai), where k and ex are constants. (This dissertation, 
of course, has adopted this form in all the chapters thus far.) If 
this specification is correct, then ex/ci < O. On the other hand, 
the double-logarithmic specification log m = y + Xi, where y and X 
are constants, has been very popular in studies of the demand for 
money during the moderate inflations in postwar Western countries. 
Of course the double-logarithmic specification implies ex/ci = O. 
From moderate inflations, too, there is a body of evidence 
which is especially relevant, as in the case of rapid inflations. 
Here we refer to the large number of tests of the liquidity-trap 
hypothesis. nIf the liquidity-trap hypothesis is true, it nrust be 
the case that the [absolute value of the] interest elasticity of 
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the demand for money becomes greater as the rate of interest 
fals.oo ft (Laidler (1977), po 130). Laidler concludes: Ithe evi-
dence on the liquidity trap is not quite clear-cuto On the whole, 
the evidence goes against the hypothesiso •• ' (Laidler (1977), 
p. 132). 
We infer that the turning point associated with X = -1 will 
minimize (not maximize) domestic real per capita private consump-
tion. Given the structure of Mathieson's model this is simply be-
cause the turning point in question is associated with maximal 
inflation-cu~growth payments by the domestic private sector on its 
holdings of real balances, and no offsetting reduction in the net 
explicit taxes paid by that sector. That a unit elasticity of money 
demand will maximize public revenue from inflation has been recog-
nized at least since Cagan (1956). (See also Friedman (1971).) 
The question then arises: which sector will derive maximum 
benefit from the consumption-minimizing crawl? This is not 
clear in Mathieson (1976); the rate of crawl is assumed to be con-
trolled by the domestic public sector, yet the relevant section of 
Mathieson's paper also assumes the domestic monetary base is wholly 
foreign in source. Despite his argument to the contrary (see 
pp. 189-190), it is difficult to see how the domestic public sector 
can control the crawl. Furthermore, it is not clear whether equi-
librium in question is one that admits or rules out sustained bor-
rowing abroad. In any event, the latter alternative would seem 
nruch more reasonable for the kind of long-run welfare (or "illfare fl ) 
analysis under consideration here. 
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One way out of these difficulties (and any other would 
appear to be a close substitute) is to assume that the home mone-
tary base is wholly domestic in source, that real per capita net 
explicit taxes are fixed, and that real per capita public spending 
is endogenous, adjusting as necessary to ensure long-run full 
equilibrium. Assume further that real per capita net ex-
plicit taxes are zero, and that the world real interest rate con-
forms to the golden rule. Note that domestic monetary growth is 
equal to the sum of foreign price growth (in terms of foreign cur-
rency), world output growth and the rate of crawl. Hence 
the follOWing analogue of equations (3.l2a)' and (3014)'; 
g - (TI* + n + e)yL(TI* + n + e), 
where g denotes steady-state real per capita domestic public spending. 
-At the unit-elasticity crawl e,,~, g attains a maxirrrum. Recalling 
'" 
(3.4e)' in the case of balanced trade, and noting that there is no 
need to distinguish between alternative definitions of 'real t con-
sumption when domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, we 
deduce that maximal g will coincide with minimal domestic private con-
., sumption, as required. 
As a final question, what is the consumption-maximizing crawl? 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, now the object of the exer-
cise is to minimize domestic public spending g. The answer is evi-
dently given by the corner solution TI* + n + e ~ 0, whence 
e ~ - (TI* + n) ~ - i*. This~ too, is readily interpreted in terms 
of standard closed-economy theory: is merely that rate of crawl 
which ensures that domestic monetary growth conforms to the 
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full-liquidity rule; for further details, see Friedman (1969)0 
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter has extended the analysis to the case of a 
small economy under flexible exchange rateso 
Under the preferred specification of inflation and exchange-
depreciation expectations, the model in the preceding chapters turns 
out to be too complex for useful short-run and stability analysiso 
Accordingly, to investigate transients we went to the special case of 
exogenous real per capita output 0 The resulting submodel is stable in 
the sense of ensuring stationary inflation and exchange depreciation rates. 
In this fixed-output framework we considered the impacts of a 
1 percent increase in the rate of domestic monetary growth, and an 
increase in the rate of foreign price growth in terms of foreign cur-
rencyo These disturbances were assumed to be previously unforseen, 
but expected to persist once they occur. 5 
The domestic monetary disturbance will only shift the antici-
pated and actual domestic-currency rates of inflation of the price of 
home output over time 0 By contrast, it will induce an immediate in-
crease in the domestic-currency rate of inflation of the price of 
foreign output in excess of 1 percent (cfo Dornbusch (1976c))o The 
overall impact on the rate of inflation of domestic living costs is 
positive, but ambiguous in magnitude. 
The foreign price disturbance will not affect the rate of in-
flation of domestic living costs, or any other domestic variable, 
'. 
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either instantaneously or in the long runo This insulation property 
holds in more general models if and only if two conditions holdo 
First, exchange-depreciation expectations must satisfy the re-
quirement of perfect myopic foresighto Second, any increase in the 
foreign inflation rate must be accompanied by a matching increase in 
the foreign nominal interest rate (cf. Turnovsky and Kingston (1977))0 
Sections 4 and 5 dealt with the long run, wherein exchange-rate 
expectations are realized as a matter of definition. Real per capita 
output was again fixed, although now as a consequence of the (definition-
al) equalization of the actual rate of inflation of the domestic-
currency price of domestic output and the anticipated rate of infla-
tion of domestic living costs. As in Chapter II, it was useful to 
distinguish between quasi and full equilibria. 
Again following Chapter II, analogies with the standard barter 
model were investigated. Not surprisingly, the analogies proposed 
there were found to carryover to the case of flexible rates. 
A more interesting exercise undertaken in that context pro-
ceeded from the observation that full equilibrium under flexible 
rates can also be attained by permitted domestic monetary growth 
(rather than the legislated deficit) to vary as is required to shut 
off net foreign borrowing so that the domestic legislaUrl deficit 
is exogenous. We then considered the effect of an increase in the 
legislated deficit on the rates of growth of domestic nominal 
variables. There is an important difference between this policy 
regime and the budgetary regime of Chapter I: now the domestic 
public sector is unable to alter the real ter~ on which it trades 
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its interest-bearing debt for money, since in the long run those 
terms are given to the small domestic country by the global capital 
market 0 
One implication of this alternative characterization of the 
budgetary regime is that starting from a position of moderate infla-
tion, each successive incremental widening of the legislated deficit 
is necessarily more inflationary than its predecessor; and as do-
mestic monetary growth approaches its revenue-maximizing rate, the 
inflation increments approach infinity. Does this help explain the 
observations of Cagan (1956) and subsequent investigators concerning 
the extreme volatility of inflations in the neighbourhood of their 
revenue-maximizing rates? 
As a final exercise in the comparative statics of the long 
run we examined the optimal crawl proposed by Mathieson (1976)0 The 
crawl in question is that which induces a unitary interest elasticity 
of money demand. Appealing to standard evidence on the demand for 
money, and drawing attention to parallels with the standard closed-
economy theory of the inflation tax, we argued that the proposed 
crawl will minimize rather than maximize private consumptiono 1his 
policy was shawn to admit a reinterpretation in terms of maximal 
consumption by the domestic public sector. Attention was drawn 
to the crawl which induces a zero interest elasticity of money de-
mando This alternative policy will maximize domestic private con-
sumptiono This merely restates a version of the full-
liquidity rule: if the world real interest rate conforms to the 
golden rule, then the domestic nominal money stock should be constant. 
CHAPTER IV 
INFLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
THE WORLD ECONOMY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the role of national economic policies, 
especially budgetary policies, in the causes and consequences of in-
flation at the global level. This section contains a critical review 
of some of the relevant literature. Most of the main ideas in the 
long-run literature have been introduced in Chapters I and II, and 
some remaining gaps will be filled in Sections 2 and 3 below, so the 
focus here is on contributions pertaining to the short run. 
The repercussion multiplier literature (see, e.g., Mundell 
(1968, Ch. 7), Stern (1973)) is a natural starting point. Given the 
usual short-run recursive link between inflation and excess demand 
(see below), this literature is relevant to the issues at hand. As-
suming the terms of trade are predetermined, the basic implication 
for short-run inflation theory is simple: if any national public 
sector undertakes an expansionary fiscal policy, then aggregate de-
mand in every trading country in the world will rise, so that all 
trading countries' CPI inflation rates will rise. 
In the absence of restrictive assumptions on IS-curve and 
Phillips-curve parameters, however, we cannot say more than that. 
To see this, consider the following elementary Keynes-Phillips world, 
consisting of countries A and B, and an equalize~ pegged nominal 
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interest rate r (more on this later): 
-
-qa = Z +g + x qb = zb + gb + xb , a a a 
Z = (l-s )q - L r zb = (l-s)q - Lor , a a a a b b 
x = (l-sb)~zb - (l-s )m Z , xb x a a a a a 
ya(qa-qa) yb(q-qb) -Pa = + TT , Pb - + TTb a 
pI = (l-m)p + m Pb pI = (l-~)Pb + ~Pa , a a a a b 
where a bar denotes a pegged, fixed or predetermined variable; sub-
scripts denote countries; and A's endogenous variables are 
q = real per capita output in A, Z = real per capita aggregate pri-
a a 
vate spending by residents of A, x = real per capita trade surplus, 
a 
p = rate of inflation of the price of A's output, pi = rate of in-
a a 
f1ation of A's CPl. Additionally, ga = real per capita spending by 
A's public spending on A's output. As s ume 0 < s , m < 1 and 
a a 
Y t ~ O. Analogous considerations apply to B. a' a 
Since stocks of factors of production and commodity prices in 
terms of the producers' currency are taken to be predetermined through-
out this section, it is not essential to distinguish between nominal 
and real per capita magnitudes. We have done so, however, because 
some of these variables are re-used in Sections 2 and 3 below, in 
which context the distinction is important. 
An obvious question to ask of this model is whether expansion-
ary fiscal policy in A induces a greater increase in A's CPI inf1a-
tion rate than in B's cpr inflation rate. Straightforward manipu1a-
tion of the foregoing model yields 
-dg 
a 
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= 
where 0 < h. - (l-s. )(l-m.) < 1, 
~ ~ ~ 
and 0< r 
i = a,b, 
Even under the "classical presumption" of transfer theory, namely, 
ma~ < 1 (and note that our CPI specification facilitates a better-
behaved framework than is usually the case; see Chapter II), we are 
unable to answer the question without introducing unappealing re-
strictions on IS-curve and Phillips-curve parameters. 
Working with output sectors essentially the same as that in 
the model just examined, analysts have introduced relative-price ele-
ments (see, e.g., Laursen and Metzler (1950), Meade (1951), Mundell 
(1968, Ch. 18»; and monetary sectors (se~ e.g., Mundell (1968, 
Ch. 18), Cooper (1969), Roper (1971), Swoboda and Dornbusch (1973». 
Since Mundell's analysis extends in both directions, it serves as a 
convenient focus for further discussion of some of the problems in 
the construction of short-run global models. 
The model in question contains a pair of national IS curves, 
a pair of national LM curves, a simple 'gold-standard' model of the 
international system in the case of fixed rates, and a traditional 
static expectations model of exchange-rate determination in the case 
of flexible rates. It assumes perfect international integration of 
national capital markets, partial integration of national commodity 
markets, and zero international integration of national markets for 
money stocks and labour. 
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Its fixed-rate version effectively captures the main ingred-
ients of the short-run monetary approach to the balance of payments, 
and does not generate any anomalous propositions as a consequence of 
thato More debatable (albeit entirely conventional) is its symmetrical 
"gold-standard" explanation of international payments arrangements: 
there is a fixed nominal quantity of international reserves (gold?), 
which is shifted back and forth between the two national economies in 
response to goods-market and money-market disturbances. This frame-
work is at variance with the postwar facts in three respects. 
First, there is ample evidence that the predominant interna-
tional asset in postwar official portfolios has been the interest-
bearing debt issued by the public sectors of a few key-currency 
countries, especially the United States. For evidence, see , e.g., 
Whitman (1974), (1975). Second, Whitman also reports that the 
United States has generally been found to have an offset coefficient 
of zero. This, too, is inconsistent with the gold-standard model. 
Third (and we shall postpone tackling this point), the stock of in-
ternational reserves has obviously not been stationary in nominal 
terms. These considerations, which clearly must playa crucial role 
in the explanation of worldwide postwar inflation under fixed rates, 
have been extensively investigated. Roper (1973), Girton and' 
Henderson (1976a,b), (1977), and Girton and Roper (1977) are the main 
analytical contributions. 
A simple way of modifying the Mundell (1968, Cho 18) model so 
as to take these considerations and contributions into account is as 
follows. Recall the two IS curves set forth earlier, and relax the 
assumption that the interest rate r is pegged. Append the national 
monetary sectors 
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c = £ (q ,r) 
a a a 
, 
where c = real per capita monetized debt issued by the public sec-
a 
tor of the reserve-currency country, c b = real per capita monetized 
debt issued by the public sector of the 'peripheral f country, and 
f = real per capita international assets held by the public sector 
of the 'peripheral' country, assumed to consist of interest-bearing 
debt of A's public sector. In other words, A takes the role of the 
"nth" country, with no official demand for foreign assets (easily 
generalized to admit the case of no "systematic" official demand 
for foreign assets), so that B supports the parity. 
Since 
= (l-s )q 
a a 
we have four equations in the four unknowns qa' qb' r, and f. 
Observe that the condition for equilibrium in B1s money 
market is completely redundant for the determination of qa' qb' and ro 
It follows that any change in c b will merely induce an equal and 
offsetting movement in B's international reserves, just as in the 
standard small-economy model under fixed rates and perfect capita l 
mobility. Any change in c
a
' on the other hand will affect qa and 
qb (and r) as in a closed economy , t hereby s hifti ng inflation rates 
at home and abroad. Another way of looking at this monetary a s y m-
metry is to assume that the national outputs qa and qb are pre-
determined rather than endogenously determined, as proposed by 
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standard pffset analysis (see, eogo, Kouri and Porter (1974». In 
that event, A's offset coefficient would be zero, whereas Bfs off-
set coefficient would be minus oneo Finally, reverting to the case 
of endogenous qa and qb' we can show that there are also national 
asymmetries with regard to the impacts of fiscal policy. But the 
model's implications in this regard are that fiscal asymmetries are 
not as sharp as monetary asymmetries (contra. the long-run fixed-
rates analysis of Section 3 below). 
Turning to the flexible-rates version of Mundell's model, 
one objection to the static-expectations approach to exchange-rate 
determination was noted in Chapter III. There are two other anoma-
lous propositions stemming from that approach. First, fiscal ex-
pansion by a small country (under flexible exchange rates and perfect 
capital mobility) will have no effect on aggregate demand in that 
country. Second, monetary expansion by a country of arbitrary rela-
tive size will lower aggregate demand in the rest of the world. 
With respect to either of these propositions, empirical find-
ings by Helliwell and associates for the postwar North American 
economy suggest that the opposite is true; see, e.g., Helliwell and 
Maxwell (1974), Helliwell (1974). Here the main ingredient would 
appear to be a regressive element in the modelling of exchange-rate 
expectations. As with the case of static exchange-rate expectations, 
however, Chapter III drew attention to some difficulties with popular 
regressive expectational hypotheses. More generally, no straight-
forward method of adequately incorporating exchange-rate transients 
into the traditional short-run model would appear to have been 
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devised, as yet. Thus we are not really in a position to offer con-
structive suggestions for improving the flexible-rates version of 
Mundell (1968, Ch. 18)~ 
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter focuses on secular as-
pects of global inflation. Both fixed and flexible rates are considered. 
Henceforth assume fixed real per capita national rates of output, and 
perfect international integration of national commodity markets. On the 
other hand it is convenient to retain the above-mentioned assumptions of 
perfect capital mobility and zero international integration of national 
markets for money stocks and labour. Section 2 investigates qu~si equili-
bria under fixed nominal interest rates. Section 3 investigates full equi-
libria under fixed real interest rates. Section 4 summarizes this chapter. 
2. QUASI EQUILIBRIUM UNDER FIXED NOMINAL INTEREST RATES 
This section analyzes inter-run interactions between national in-
flations, budget deficits, and trade deficits. It provides a mu1ti-
country counterpart of the "budgetary" explanation of inflation (see 
Chapter I). Specifically, the following questions are addressed: In a 
world of pegged nominal interest rates, what are the global inflationary 
effects of an increase in the legislated deficit in one or more countries? 
Under what conditions will higher public-sector deficits "matter", in 
the sense of affecting private disposable incomes at the national and 
global levels? And, if private incomes are affected at the national level, 
what is the role of trade deficits in international income redistributions? 
Is stability possible in a world of pegged nominal interest rates and 
endogenous monetary growth rates? 
A necessary preliminary is a more precise specification of national 
public-sector policies. 
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Public Policy 
Each public sector pegs its real per capita spending and net 
explicit tax receiptso There are no public-sector imports, nor are 
there any net explicit taxes raised from non-residentso Net explicit 
taxes are taken to be lump-sum imposts and transfers (proportional 
taxes on factor incomes would make no difference to the analysis). 
Each public sector denominates its debt issues in terms of its 
own noninterest-bearing debt. 
The nth public sector always pegs the nominal rate of return 
on its interest-bearing debt. Additionally, it never intervenes in 
foreign exchange markets and holds no international reserves. Each 
of the other public sectors pegs either the price of its noninterest-
th bearing debt in terms of the n currency, or the own-currency nominal 
rate of return on its interest-bearing debt. In the fixed-rates case, 
international reserves are held, in the form of the interest-bearing 
debt of the nth public sector; the own-currency equivalent of the 
interest proceeds are rebated to the local private sector by distri-
butionally neutral means. Domestic credit is expanded as is neces-
sary to ensure a constant international reserve ratio (cf. Johnson 
(1973». In the flexible-rates case, no international reserves are 
held o 
Public-Sector Deficits and Inflation 
This subsection establishes the following proposition: A unit 
increase in the global legislated deficit will raise the steady-state 
rate of inflation in each country by the inverse of the global real 
1 per capita stock of aggregate public debto 
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Under the assumptions introduced thus far in this chapter, 
the proposition in question holds regardless of whether the exchange 
rate of any public sector is fixed or flexible. Nor need we specify 
which subset of the n countries is responsible for the disturbance in 
questiono On the other hand, the proposition holds only in the 
neighbourhood of "mild" inflations. Also, real rates of interest 
must initially conform to the golden ruleo Previous chapters 
introduced the single- country counterparts of these initial conditions; 
their multi-country counterpart will be formalized shortlyo Also as 
in preceding chapters, assume that national labour stocks grow at a 
common rate, n, say. 
As a first step towards establishing the proposition in ques-
tion, let us write its public-sector constraint, i=l, ••• ,n, in nominal 
and real per capita terms respectively: 
• 
V. = D. + r. (V.-C.), v. = o. + p. (v.-c.)-n.c. - n.v. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
(4.1),(4.1)' 
where the subscript denotes variables referring to the ith country; 
and 
v. - V./P.N. - real per capita aggregate debt issued by its 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
public sector, 
v. - c. - (V.-C.)/P.N. = real per capita interest-bearing debt 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
issued by i's public sector, 
c. - C./P.N. - real per capita monetized debt issued by its 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
public sector, 
o. - D./P.N. - g.-t. = real per capita legislated deficit of 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
its public sector, 
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g. - G./p.N. = real per capita spending by ifs public 1. 1. 1. 1. 
sector, 
t. - T./p.N. - real per capita net explicit taxes raised 1. 1. 1. 1. 
by its public sector, 
p. - r. - 11 = real rate of return on the interest-bearing 1. 1. i 
debt issued by its public sector, 
• 
11. - p./p. 
1. 1. 1. = rate of inflation of the local-currency 
price of its output, 
• 
n. - N. /N. 
1. 1. 1. - rate of growth of its labour stock, a con-
stant. 
Note that our policy assumption concerning the redistribution of in-
terest earnings on reserves, from the public sector to the private 
sector, is necessary to ensure that the public-sector constraints for the 
'peripheral'countries are symmetrical with the public-sector constraint 
th for the n country. 
Next, transpose the fbudgetaryf policy regime into symbols. 
We have 
g. = g. , t. = t. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
for each country; and 
e . - 0 with f. - *. (c. + f.) 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
or 
f. = ° wi th p. + 11. - r. 
1. 1. 1. 1. 
according as whether country i, i # n, is maintaining a fixed or flexi-
ble exchange rate. th For the n country, on the other hand, e = 0, 
n 
f = 0, and p + 11 = r , irrespective of the exchange-rate regime. n n n n 
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Equations (402)W to (4.7)', which have obvious nominal 
counterparts (402) to (407) , introduce the variables: 
o 
e. - E./E. = rate of depreciation of the price of its cur-~ ~ ~ 
rency in terms of nis currency, 
f. - F./P.N. = real per capita international reserves held ~ ~ ~ 1. 
by the ith public sector, 
~. . = proportional international backing of i 's monetary 
1. 
base, a constant. 
Similarly, transpose the initial state into symbols: 
o 
TI. + n. 
1. ~ 
o 
- TI. + n. = 0 J J 
6~ = 6~ - 0 
1. J 
0 0 0 p. - n. = p. - n. -
1. 1. J J 
where i,j = l, ••• ,n, and the superscript (0) denotes initial values. 
It can be shown that any one of these three pairs of equations is re-
dundant in the initial steady state, given the other two pairs. 
Now select units for goods, labour stocks and currency which 
set 'nuisance' constants equal to unity, and transpose 
the arbitrage and 'growth parity' assumptions into symbols (the ab-
sence of a subscript denotes transnational variables): 
P - P - P ./E. , TI== TI - TI. - e . (4.9),(409)W n 1. 1. n 1. 1. 
r 
- r - r.-e., p 
- Pn - p. (4010), (4010)1 n 1. 1. ~ 
N 
- N - N. , n 
-
n = n. (4011), (4011) t n 1. n ~ 
where i - 1, ••• ,n; the equation numbers on the right-hand side refer 
to equations (not the identities); and 
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o 
TI - PiP = rate of inflation of the price of the numeraire 
(i.e., the nth) countryfs output, 
p - r-TI = real rate of return on the interest-bearing debt 
issued by the numeraire country's public sector, 
o 
n - N/N = rate of growth of the numeraire country's labour 
stocko 
Equations (409) to (4.12) enable us to consolidate the national 
public-sector constraints, thereby aggregating up to the global public-
sector constraint in nominal and real per capita terms respectively:2 
o n-l n-l 
v = D+r(V-C) + L e.C./E., v 
. 1 I. I. I. I.= 
= o+P(v-c)-TIC-;v+ ~ e.c. 
. 1 I. I. I.= 
(4.12), (4.12) f 
where 
n 
v - V/PN ~ ~ v. = real per capita aggregate debt issued by the 
. 1 I. I.= 
V-c 
- (V-C)/PN -
n 
c 
- C/PN 
- L 
i=l 
n 
0 - D/PN - L 
i=l 
n 
g 
- G/PN 
- L 
i=l 
n 
t 
- T/PN = L 
i=l 
world's public sector, 
n 
L (v.-c.) = real per capita interest-bearing debt 
. 1 I. I. I.= 
issued by the world's public sector, 
c. = real per capita monetized debt issued by the I. 
world's public sector, 
o. == g-t = real per capita legislated deficit of the I. 
world ts public sector, 
g. = real per capita spending by the worldts public I. 
sector, 
t. = real per capita net explicit taxes raised by I. 
the world IS public sector. 
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Equation (4.12) states t hat in terms of the numera ire cur-
rency, the world's public sector finances its legislat ed de f i cit 
and interest obligations by issuing debt and/or by depreciating 
the numeraire currency. Equation (4012)' reveals that in real per 
capita terms, the inflation tax on monetized debt, TIC, and the 
growth tax on aggregate debt, nv, raise revenue for the world's 
public sectoro 
Finally, to establish the proposition in question, consider 
the steady-state counterpart of (4.12)', to which we apply the policy 
equations (4.2)', (403)', (4.4)', and (4.5)'; the initial conditions 
(408)'; and equations (4.9)', (4.10)' and (4.ll)f--the conditions 
for purchasing power parity, interest rate parity and growth parity 
respectively. This yields 
dTI*/d6 = l/v* , 
as requiredo 
This result warrants further comment 0 In the first place, it 
represents a straightforward generalization of one of our main closed-
economy results; see Chapter 10 (That result, in turn, is a variable-
inflation counterpart of one of the main results in Christ (1968), 
(1969).)3 
Second, there is symmetry between countries. Specifi cally, 
each public sector has equal scope for raising inflation-tax 
revenues from the world's private sector. By contrast, the best-
known multicountry extensions of inflation-tax theory, namely, 
Mundell (1971), (1972), suggest that the nth public sector will have 
much more scope for taxing the rest of the world than the other n-l 
public sectors, at least in the case of fixed exchange rates . The 
III 
difference can be explained partly by the fact that Mundell charac-
th terizes expansionary public policy in the n country as a fiscal-
accommodated monetary expansion (see Chapter I), which the other n-l 
public sectors are unable to emulate because they must permit nominal 
monetary growth to be endogenous. Another source of difference is 
that he is concerned with full equilibria rather than quasi equili-
bria. (We shall find that Mundellian asymmetries in the fixed-rates 
case re-emerge when we go to the case of full equilibrium; see 
Section 30) Finally, he assumes that reserves are held in the form 
of noninterest-bearing debt of the nth public sector. 
Third, there is symmetry between exchange-rate regimes. This 
is in line with an observation made by, for example, Porter (1976): 
ln a world of perfect capital mobility and fixed nominal interest 
rates, flexible rates will not provide relatively more insulation of 
the domestic inflation rate. The underlying reasoning, which was 
outlined in Chapter III, is very simple: if national nominal 
interest rates are pegged, then international arbitrage will effect-
ively peg exchange depreciation rates. As might be expected, this 
is another instance wherein symmetry does not hold under the "ultra-
long-run" conditions investigated in Section 3 below. 
Public-Sector Deficits and Private Disposable Income 
This subsection establishes the following propositions: in 
each country, steady-state private disposable income is given by 
home output plus the home trade deficit minus home public spending, 
where each of these variables is in real per capita terms. Hence 
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global steady-state private disposable income will decline one-to-
one with any increase in global public spending, but is invariant 
with respect to any change in global net explicit taxes. 
The first step towards deriving this proposition is to intro-
duce its private-sector budget constraint in nominal and real per 
capita terms respectively: 
where 
• 
w. Y. Z. • = - w. = y. - Z. 1. 1. 1. , 1. 1. 1. (4.14), (4014) t 
i - 1,0 •• ,n, and 
w. - W./p.N. = real per capita aggregate public debt held by 1. 1. 1. 1. 
its private sector, 
-
y. - q.-t. + p. (w.-c.) - TI.C. - n.w. = its real per capita 
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
private disposable income, 
q. - O./p.N. = its real per capita output, taken to be fixed, 1. "i 1. 1. 
z. - Z./P.N. = real per capita aggregate spending by irs pri-1. 1. 1. 1. 
vate sectoro 
As in the case of the public-sector constraints (401), the policy as-
sumption that interest earnings from international reserves are re-
bated is important to ensure symmetry across countries and exchange-
rate regimes. 
Consider next irs national expenditure identity, in nominal and 
real per capita terms respectively: 
~ - Z. + G. + X. , q. - z. + g. + x. (4015), (4015)' 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
where x. - x. Ip. N. = 
1. 1. 1. 1. 
irs real per capita trade surplus, i =1,0 0 0 ,n, 
n 
and L x. 
-
0 • 
i=l 1. 
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These notions require no further comment. 
The steady-state counterpart of (4.14)', the identity (4.15)', 
and the assumption that q i is fixed, together imply the first part 
of the proposition under consideration: 
* y. 
1. 
* - q - x i i 
where i ; l,.oo,no And summation over all countries yields the 
second part: 
y* 
n 
where y - I: 
i;l 
- q g 
y. ; 
1. real per capita global disposable income, 
q. ; real per capita global output, 
1. 
; real per capita global public spending. 
Equations (4016)1 and (4.17)', which have the elementary 
(4,,16)f 
trcrowding-outtt implications noted at the beginning of this subsection, 
may be seen to rely on the" assumption of perfect goods-market inte-
gration. Otherwise there would be terms-of-trade complications; see 
Chapter II. Less obviously, they rely on the assumption of a 'mild' 
inflation; see Section 3 below. 
One corollary of (4.17)' is dY */dt ; 0, which is analogous 
to what Buchanan and Wagner (1976) have termed the ItRicardian Invari-
ance TheoremH--or, it makes no eventual difference to private dispos-
able income whether a given increase in government outlays is financed 
by printing money or by selling bonds. Our claim is that it 
makes no eventual difference to aggregate private disposable income 
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whether a given increase in government outlays is financed by ex-
plicit taxes or by inflation taxes o 
Public-Sector Deficits and Trade Deficits 
Aumt This subsection establishes the following proposition: 
increase in the global real per capita legislated deficit will worsen 
the real per capita trade balance of each country by the home public 
sector's share in global increases in legislated deficits, minus 
the home private sector's share in global aggregate public debto 
The first step towards establishing this proposition is to 
explain the sources of accumulation (or decumulation) of public 
debt by each countryrs private sector. Insert the defimtion of 
y. into (4.14)', and use (4015)' to eliminate Z.o This yields 
l l 
w. ; o. + x. + p. (w.-c.) - TI.C. - n.w., 
l l l l l l l l l l 
i;l,o.o,n, in real per capita terms; its nominal counterpart (4018) 
(not shown) is equally straightforward to derive. 
Next, recall the operations immediately preceding (4013)'0 
This yields the required result: 
* -
- dx./do ; 
l 
~ ~ * 
0.10 - w./w* , 
l l 
where i;l, ••• ,n; a hat (~) denotes small deviations in a variable; 
and 
w - v ; global real per capita public debto 
We make two comments on this result. First, a standard propo-
sition in the theory of small open economies (discussed at 
length In Chapter II) is that an increase in public spending or a re-
duction in net explicit taxes will raise the trade deficit by the 
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same amount. 
'Tl'L. bId h '" f h . th LUe a ove resu t re uces to t at proposltlon l tel
public sector has a unit share in any increases in the world's legis-
lated deficit (i.e., 6. = 0 for j ~ i) and the ith private sector 
J 
has a zero share in global public debt (i.e., w./w = 0)0 Both these 
l 
assumptions underlie the standard small-country analysis. Our multi-
country approach to the problem draws attention to the restrictive 
nature of these assumptions, especially the former. This reveals an-
other pitfall in the "New School's" approach to balance-of-payments 
forecasting (see Chapter II), since that approach typically disre-
gards fiscal developments in the rest of the world; see, e.g., 
Godley and Cripps (1973). 
Second, define a rr,co- ordinated" global fiscal expansion as one 
which does not disturb the initial balance of trade. (From conditions 
(4.8)1 and the steady-state counterpart of (4.18)1, we see that trade 
is everywhere balanced in the initial steady state.) Then the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for such an expansion is that national 
public-sector shares in the increased global legislated deficit equal 
national private-sector shares in the initial stock of public debt. 
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Stability 
This subsection establishes the following proposition: t he 
policy regime under consideration will, at best, stabilize all vari-
abIes except the share of each national public sector in the global 
supply of interest-bearing public debt--that variable is, at best, 
only neutrally stableo 
Thus far we have made minimal use of assumptions on private-
sector behaviour. Such assumptions must now be introduced 0 Postu-
late the private expenditure functions 
z. = z. + (l-s.)y. - t.P. + w.w. , 
l l l l l l l l 
and the money-market equilibrium conditions 
c. + f. = t. (q., r., w.) 
l l l l l l (4.20)' 
where 0 < s. < 1 and w. > 0 for i=l, ••• ,n; f. ~ 0 for i=l,ooo,n-l; and l l l 
f = O. Equations (4019)' require no further comrnento Equations n 
(4.20)' embody a more general specification of money demand than we 
have utilized hitherto, because a restrictive formulation turns out 
to be unnecessary in the present context. 
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It can be shown that by introducing (4.19)' and (4.20)' we 
have closed the model; the details are not set out. The complete 
model is conveniently recursive, especially in deviation form. 
Even so, to ascertain the stability of the model in the case of 
an arbitrary number of countries is a complex task which does not 
repay the effort involved. 
Accordingly, consider the two-country dynamic subsystem: 
• 
.... 
w. 
~ 
0 
0 
.... * .... 
= x. - W 11, ~ i 
.... + .... = w.w. x. 
~ ~ ~ 
- L X. , 
~ 
* [(l-s.)w. 
~ ~ 
L.]fT , 
~ 
where i=l 2· a hat ( .... ) , , denotes a small deviation from the steady-state 
value of a variable; and the details of haw these equations are de-
rived is relegated to a footnote. 4 The characteristic polynomial of 
this system is easily found to be 
0 1 * -"A 0 -w 1 
0 -"A 0 1 -w* 2 
f("A) - WI 0 1 0 - [(1-s )w*- Ll ] 1 1 , 
0 1 * (,1)2 0 - [(l-s )w - L
2
] 2 2 
0 0 1 1 0 
which yields the characteristic equation 
+ 
= 0 • 
w OJ w* 1 2 
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As essentially is the case in a closed economy under the 
"budgetary regime" (see Chapter I), the critical expression is 
* [(l-s.)w. - L.], i=1,2-- 'critical' in the sense that a necessary ~ ~ ~ 
* condition for stability is ~I(l-s.)w. - t.] > 0, and a sufficient 
~ ~ ~ 
condition for instability is the reverse of that inequalityo The 
relevant economic considerations were discussed at length in 
Chapter I. 
Consider now the following subsystem involving asset creation 
by national public sectors: 
~ * A V - - v. n 
~ (4.24) i 
where i=1,2; and the equations in question follow from (4.1)' and the 
operations immediately preceding (4.13)'. To investigate the sta-
bility of v., i=1,2, form the following 7 x 7 bordered determinant: ~ 
l:J(A) -
rCA) o 0 I • 
, : • • 
• 
'0 0 ----------~--------
*, 00 •• 0 -v -A 0 1 1 
I 
*1 o ... 0 -v I 0 - A 
2 , 
which yields the characteristic equation 
2 A rCA) = 0 . 
, 
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Clearly there are (at least) two zero eigenvalues, so that the 
subsystem in question is (at best) neutrally stableo 
The remaining step towards establishing stability proper-
ties of the complete model is to verify that with 
~ ~ 
the exception of (vI - c l ) and (v2 - c 2 ), all the endogenous vari-
abIes in their perturbed states are either zero or linear combina-
tions of w.o The details are quite straightforward, albeit tedious, 1 
and are not set out. 
30 FULL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER FIXED REAL INTEREST RATES 
Thus far our multi-country analysis has proceeded on the as-
sumption that national public sectors are able to hold down the 
nominal rate of return on their interest-bearing debt--even in the 
face of a sustained rise in the inflation rate. It might be ob-
jected that the model does not capture substitution considerations 
which militate against the long-run feasibility of this policy. One 
example is the neglect of the margin of substitution between money and 
durable goods. 
Another questionable aspect of the analysis, from a longer-run 
standpoint, is the (at best) neutral stability of the stocks of 
interest-bearing liabilities of national public sectors. 
Finally, the analysis of the preceding section is heavily de-
pendent on the assumption that inflation is confined to the neighbour-
hood of its full-liquidity rate--which, of course, means a negative 
rate of inflation, providing the rate of population and real output 
growth is significantly positive, and the real rate of interest is in 
the neighbourhood of its golden-rule rate. What can we say about the 
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budgetary aspects of global inflations which proceed more briskly 
than that? 
This section addresses these issues,in a somewhat different 
setting to that of Section 2D The reason is that simply to impose an 
alternative policy regime on our Section 2 model would ensue in ex-
cessive complication, and would also raise the awkward problem of de-
fining real private disposable income when the deadweight losses 
arising from suboptimal holdings of real balances are no longer of the 
second order of smalls. Our approach is to set aside goods-market 
equilibrium conditions and the question of the appropriate definition 
of private disposable income, instead bringing to the fore 
the interactions between public-sector budget constraints and money-
market equilibrium conditionsD 
Put another way, our approach is to take the well-known 
cagan-BaileyS model of inflation in a closed economy; superimpose some 
of the extensions of that model proposed by Mundell (1972), Cathcart 
(1974) and others (the former reference extends the Cagan-Bailey model 
to the case of two countries); and investigate the consequences of at 
least one national public sector choosing to peg its real per capita 
legislated deficit rather than the rate of growth of its nominal mone-
tized debto In doing so~ and in contrast to most of the preceding ana-
lysis, we are also able to ascertain existence and uniqueness proper-
ties, owing to the simplicity of the model, and to a modified version 
of the novel and revealing diagram developed in Turnovsky (1978). 
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As sump ti ons 
Despite these and other differences between the Section 2 
model and the one here, we retain the assumptions concerning the 
extent to which various markets are integrated internationally; 
fixed national real per capita rates of output (i.eo, q. = q.); 1. 1. 
perfect myopic foresight of the exchange depreciation rate; and a 
common global growth rate, n say. Also as in Section 2, interna-
tiona1 reserves earn interest, and are held if and only if the 
local parity is pegged. 
We also bring back assumptions sometimes used in preceding 
chapters. Specifically, recall the semilogarithmic specification 
¢. 
of money demand (i.e., t. = k.q.1. exp[-a. (p. + IT.)]); the assump-1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
tion that the interest-bearing debt of national public sectors is 
indexed and yields a golden-rule real rate of return -(i. e., p . =no ); 1. 1. 
and the adaptive specification of inflation expectations. 
On the other hand, there is the new assumption that the real 
per capita interest-bearing debt of each public sector is pegged--
• 
in nominal terms, (V. - C.)/(V.-C.) = IT. + n. This serves to ex-1. 1. 1. 1. 1. i 
clude quasi equilibria of the kind discussed in the preceding sec-
tiona Note that the policy regime to be studied in this section 
would be incompatible with the Section 2 model, since it would over-
determine that system. 
In the present case, there are not yet enough policy rules t o 
close the system. Nevertheless it is worth pausing to formalize the 
discussion thus far: 
(4.25 a) " (4.25 b ) , 
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if = f3 (p - n ) 
a a a a (4.27a)' ,(4.27b)' 
€ = (4.28)' 
Equations (4.25)' merely restate equations (4.1)' in the special 
case of two countries (A and B once again), and the policy regime de-
scribed earlier in this sectiono With regard to (4026)', note that 
they reflect qa = qb = 1 (see Chapter I); and that real per capita re-
serves f exceed zero if and only if the rate of exchange depreciation 
€ is pegged at zero (see below). Concerning (4.27)', and recalling 
that inflation expectations were characterized by the perfect myopic 
foresight hypothesis in Section 2, the reversion to an adaptive hypo-
thesis might be puzzling. The explanation is that the model yields 
two kinds of steady-state equilibria, one kind necessarily character-
ized by rates of inflation in the hyperinflation range, and the other 
kind being consistent with inflations less rapid than that. We wish 
to focus on the latter. Under perfect myopic foresight and sluggish 
price-level adjustment, the former kind of equilibrium is stable and 
the latter kind is unstable. But under adaptive expectations, and 
given the Cagan stability condition, the reverse situation is true. 
Hence equations (4.27)'. Finally, equation (4.28)' constitutes an 
elementary purchasing-power-parity explanation of exchange rate move-
ments,as is required when A and B goods are perfect substitutes. 
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Flexible Exchange Rates 
Since it is simpler, we begin with the flexible-rates case. We 
close the foregoing model by imposing 
6 = 6 
a a 
(4.29) , 
f=O 
so that the endogenous variables are c
a
' c b ' Pa' Pb' TIa' TIb , and €. 
Note, too, that we shall refer as is convenient to national nominal 
rates of monetary growth ~a and ~, given by 
~ = c I c + P + n, LL.. = cb / c b + Pb + n, a a a a . b . (4.30a)' , (4. 30b) , '-
and ex ante national nominal rates of interest, given by 
(4.3Ia) " (4. 3lb) , 
')'( * * It follows that II. rand TI + n may be used interchangeably (as can 
P"a' a a 
their B counterparts), which considerably simplifies the analysis. 
The ensuing overall model of a flexible-rates world is both 
recursive and decomposable. Thus, for example, each country's internal 
variables are wholly independent of those in the other country, so 
that without loss of generality we can confine attention to one country, 
A say. 
That country's steady state can be summarized by the pair of 
equations 
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-
* * 6 - ~a c = 0 a a (4.32a)' 
* * c k exp(-a ~ ) = o · a a a a (40 33a) , 
Equations (4.32a)t and (4.33a)' have an interesting geometrical re-
presentation; see Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2 embodies notions similar to those of Figure 1 of 
Turnovsky (1978) (though Turnovsky postulates a linear money demand 
function). Using essentially the same notation as Turnovsky (1978), 
* * the GAGA schedule shows the combinations of c
a 
and ~a that are con-
sistent with A's public sector balancing its steady-state budget. It 
is a rectangular hyperbola. (In the Cagan-Bailey model, by contrast, 
the appropriate policy schedule is a horizontal line,representing the 
authorities' choice of a particular rate of nominal monetary growtho) 
* * The LALA schedule shows the combinations of c
a 
and ~a that are con-
sistent with A's private sector balancing its steady-state portfolio. 
It belongs to the exponential family. 
* Figure 2 depicts the special case 0 < ~ < lla or, equivalently, 
a a 
- -1 
o < 6 < k (2.7 x a ) ; the alternatives are discussed subsequently, a a a 
as is the choice of PA as the relevant equilibrium even though LALA 
cuts GAGA at QA as well. It is easily shown that the two schedules 
, 
have the same slopes at RA and RA, where those points correspond to 
* ~ = l/a . The shaded rectangle shows A's steady-state legislated a a 
deficit--or, in conventional terminology, its steady-state revenue 
from money creationo The shaded triangular area shows the deadweight 
loss arising from the fact that A's public sector is printing money at 
a rate faster than that prescribed by the full-liquidity rule. 
Nominal 
monetary 
growth 
1 
~ 
a 
* 
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* * c (==.t ) 
a a 
k 
a 
Real intensive money balances 
FIGURE 2 
Full-Equilibrium Budget and Portfolio Balance in an 
Intermediate-Sized Economy under Fixed Real Interest 
and Flexible Exchange Rates 
Figure 2 leads to the following simple observation: under full 
equilibrium and fixed real interest rates, the system would be over-
determined in the event that a public sector were independently to peg 
both its legislated deficit and the rate at which it creates nominal 
noninterest-bearing debt. By pegging the legislated deficit (i.e., by 
anchoring the GAGA schedule), a public sector determines its total 
revenues from money creation. And by exhibiting a Itstable" demand for 
money (cf. the LA LA schedule), the private sector takes up the system's 
remaining degree of freedom. 
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Despite its rudimentary character, this line of argument has 
a policy implication which is both important and little understood: 
advocacy of a constant monetary growth rule should go hand in hand 
with advocacy of an accommodating fiscal policy. If, for example, 
nominal monetary growth is reduced from x percent per annum to zero, 
and then held at that rate, then fiscal policy should be conducted so 
as to ensure that the difference between public spending and net 
explicit taxes (expressed as a fraction of the base money stock) is 
able to follow suit. 6 
As a final exercise In comparative steady states under flexible 
rates, consider the implications of successively more inflationary 
initial states. '-
At 6~ = 0 (i.e., ~~ = 0) there exists a unique equilibrium, 
at the intersection of L L and the horizontal axis of Figure 2. The 
AA 
* relationship ~ = n + n and equation (4.32a)f together imply 
a a 
(= 1 /k ) • 
a 
Alternatively (for future reference): 
The overall result is comparable to (4.13)'. There are two note-
worthy differences, however . First, the relevant inflation-tax 
base lS narrower, * * i.e., c <w. 
a 
Second, increased deficits in B 
have no effect on A's inflation rate, and vice-versa o The classical 
"insulation property" of flexible-rate regimes is reinstated. 
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" -1 
At 0 < 50 < k (2.7xa) there exist two equilibria, one 
a a a 
below the rate of monetary growth associated with maximal revenue 
*" from money creation (i.e., !-La = 1 faa)' and the other above that 
rate; see Figure 2. Focusing on the former case, from (4.32a)', 
* * (4 .33a)' and the re lationship!-L = n + n, we deduce 
a a 
(dn*fd6\ ~ a a) 0 
o <!-L < 1 fa 
a a 
.L * 
= l/c"(l -a !-L ) > 0, 
a a a 
(~f1:~f1:_, 
~5/5 ) 
a a 0 < 0 < 1/a !-La a 
* = 1 /.(1 - a !-L ) > 1 • 
a a 
" The restoration of budget balance after an increase in the legis-
lated deficit requires a more than proportional increase in 
the rate of monetary growth, as a consequence of the induced 
reduction in the relevant tax base. In the terminology of Mundell 
(1972), there is a secondary "volume" effect in addition to the 
primary "value" effect. 
50 -1 0 
At = k (2.7 x a) (i.e.,!-L = 1/a ) there exists one 
a a a a a 
equilibrium, given by the tangency of GAGA to LALA in Figure 2. 
I • 
Points RA and RA wlll coincide. Figure 2 also suggest s that the pure 
waste of inflationary deficit finance, as compared with noninflationary 
finance, reaches a maximum at this point. In fact this "collection 
cost" is ea-sily shown to equal roughly 170 percent of the legislated 
deficit; cf. Bailey (1956). On the other hand, calculations of this 
type are of questionable relevance inasmuch as they neglect the costs of 
raising explicit taxes; cf. Phelps (1972). The responses of inflation 
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and nominal monetary growth at the margin under consideration are 
given by 
= 
= (l/a ) 
a 
(1 la )-
a 
as noted in Chapter III. 
At 6 0 > k (2.7 x a )-1, no equilibrium exists. This suggests 
a a a _ 
that actual inflations in excess of the revenue-maximizing rate 
* TI = lla - n either are transitory phenomena or are generated by a 
a a 
policy regime different to that considered here. For example, pro-
* viding aa~a were less than unity for some ~a > 1, the Cagan-Bailey 
-
policy ~ = ~ would be capable of generating such an inflation; see 
a a 
Cagan (1956) or Chapter I above. 
Fixed Exchange Rates 
Now we adept the model consisting of equations (4.25)' 
to (4.28 )' to the case of fixed exchange rates. There are two 
interesting ways of introducing that regime into the model. One is 
to postulate that B (as well as A) pegs its legislated deficit 0b' 
thereby relinquishing proximate control over the composition , f/(c b + f), 
as well as the level c b + f, of its real per capita monetary base. The 
other is to assume that B does wish to exert proximate control over 
the composition of its monetary base, in which event it must relinquish 
proximate control over its legislated deficit. We shall deal with 
these two cases in turn. 
Formally, the first variant ~s described by 
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° 
= 
° a a 
°b = °b 
(4.34)' 
€ 
= 0 , 
so that the endogenous variables are ca ' cb ' Pa' Pb' TIa' TIb , and f. 
Additionally, equations (4.30)' and (4.31)' cont in~e to apply, 
providing ~ is interpreted as referring to CblCb rather than ~/~. 
(Of course, this distinction need not be made when one is comparing 
steady states.) 
Unlike the flexible rates model, the overall fixed-rate 
model cannot be split into subsystems describing each national 
economy in isolation. But it is still conveniently recursive. 
This is apparent from the following summary of the steady-state 
relationships: 
,to 
-,'( 
" 
° 
- l-1a c a a = 0 (4 .35a) , 
..t. ..t. ,... ,... 
c k exp(-a 1-1 ) 
a a a a 
= 0 (4.36a), 
7~ ,,~ ,... 
°b - f.La cb = 0 (4. 35b) t 
(4 .36b) , 
The nature of the recursivity is quite simple. The world rate 
of growth of nominal variables is simultaneously determined by A's 
budget balance schedule (4.35~' and its portfolio-balance schedule 
* (4.300)'. B must accept this rate \-1
a
, which together with B' s 
legislated deficit 0b' determines the domestic source component 
* of B's monetary base cb ; see (4.35b)'. Finally, these relationships 
together with B's money-market equilibrium condition (4.~)f, 
determine the level of B's reserves f*. 
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In summary, and in contrast to Section 2, we find a re-
emergence of Mundellian asymmetries between key-currency countries 
and the rest of the world. Indeed, the rest of the world's loss 
of policy autonomy is more severe than is often thought to be the 
case, inasmuch as B's public sector cannot peg both its legislated 
deficit 0b and its international reserves as a proportion of B's 
monetary base ¥= F/Lb) , even if B is not a small country_ 
The next step is to consider the fixed-rates counterpart 
of Figure 2. The left-hand panel of Figure 3 below requires 
no further connuent. In the right-hand panel, GBGB shows the 
* combinations of cb that are consistent with B's public sector 
balancing its steady-state budget, for exogenously-given values 
of !-La and 0b- The L L schedule shows the combinations of f B B 
that are consistent with B's private sector balancing its portfolio, 
* * for exogenously-given values of !-La and cb - Other features depicted 
by Figure 3 should be obvious in the light of the foregoing discuss i on 
of Figure 2. No te that as it stands, Figure 3 suffices to represent 
the case wherein ~ rather than 0b is pegged; see be l ow. 
In examining the comparative-static properties of (4 .35a) ' -
(4.36b)', we confine attention to the intermediate case 
o -1 0 o < ° < k (2.7 x cx ) and 0 <!-L < min(1 Icx
a
, 1 I CY. ). (It follows 
a a a a b 
that 0b cannot be pegged at a level less than zero. ) The effect of an 
increase in A's legislated deficit on the world rate of growth of nominal 
'1\ 
!-La 
o 
LA LB 
Country A G ·B Country B 
ok 7, 
c (=.R, ) 
a a 
k 
a 
FIGURE 3 
GA * 7~ 
(1-~ )!-L
a 
o 
.J~ 
" Cb 
Full-Equilibrium Budget and Portfolio Balance in a Two-
Country World Under Fixed Real Interest and Exchange Rates 
P
B 
* 
-\ 
~GB 
kb 
t-I 
LV 
t-I 
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-/( * 
variables is the same as the effect of an increase in ° on n or II. a a I""'a 
in the case of flexible rates (see above), and therefore requires no 
further discussion. 
-
Other fixed-rate effects of an increase in ° include 
a 
* * dcblcb 
d6 1o 
a a 
1 
1 - ex ~ 
a a 
< -1 , 
* - * * > sgn [df I do] = sgn [1 - ~ - a. ~ ] < O. a . b a 
The first result is straightforward. An increase in A's legislated 
7\ * 
deficit will raise B's inflation-cum-growth tax rate ~b(=~a)' which 
* necessitates a reduction in B's inflation-cum-growth tax base c b in 
order to preserve budget balance in B. The second result, on the other 
hand, lS a little more complicated. An increase in A's legislated 
deficit will lower the opportunity cost of holding real per capita 
* ok 
money balances in B--specifically, rb (=~a) will rise. Hence \ will 
decline. Offsetting this negative effect on B's real per capita re-
~,~ 
" 
serves is a decline in the domestic source component c b of B's monetary 
ok 
base tb o The overall effect is ambiguous, and will depend on the in-
itial relative magnitudes of the steady-state proportion of domestic 
* assets In B's monetary base, 1 - ~ , and the steady-state interest elas-
* ticity of money demand by B residents, ~~a' This ambiguity is readily 
deduced from Figure 3. 
Observe, too, that 
.L. .L. 
dc~/c~ 
= 1 
d ob/ ob 
.J.- ..J~ 
df" If" * 1 - ~ 
* 
< O. 
In other words, an increase In B's legislated deficit will raise the 
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domestic source component of B's monetary base and lower the foreign 
source component by the same amount, leaving B's overall monetary 
base unchanged. In the light of the previous explanations . these. 
results require no further comment. 
Consider next the case of a pegged rather than endogenous 
international reserve ratio ~, whence B's legislated deficit <5b 
is endogenous rather than pegged. Formally, replace (4.34)' by 
<5 = <5 
a a 
(4.37) , 
€ = ° 
(Assume ° < ~ < 1, for simplicity.) 
Similarly, replace the steady-state equations (~.35b)' a~d (4 .36b)' by 
* 
~t.. 
* " <5 b - ~a (1 - '~)kb exp (-ab~a) = 0, (4. :f3b) , 
.,~ 
* f - o/~ exp (-ab~a) = 0. (4 .39b)' 
Together with (4.~' and (4.36~', these equations yield a recursive 
system. We proceed directly to the comparison of steady states in 
the intermediate case 0 < 00 < k (2.7 x a ) -1 and 0 <~o < min(l la ,1 lab) . 
a a a a a 
Again the effect of an increase in <5 on the world rate of 
a 
growth of nominal variables is the same as the effect of an increase 
* * in <5 on n and ~ in the case of flexible rates. Other comparative-
a a a 
statical results include: 
* * * * d<5b /<5b 1 -~~a 
oJ. oJ. -~~a " " 
> 0, df If < 0, = = 
-
* 
-
oJ. 
10 10 " do 1 - a ~ do 1 - a ~ a a a a a a a a 
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* i~ d 6b /6b 
= 1 • 
d ~ I~· 
An increase in A's legislated deficit will raise the world rate of 
growth of nominal variables. Hence Bls real per capita monetary base 
willd~ine. With money~rketequilibrium and a pegged reserve ratio 
in B, this induces a reduction in both the domestic and foreign source 
components of Bls monetary base. In the intermediate range of in-
flation rates under consideration, Bls revenues from money creation will 
rise, and must be dissipated by an increased legislated deficit in Bo 
An increase in Bls reserve ratio will increase (reduce) the 
foreign (domestic) source component of Bls monetary base. Since the 
domestic source component of Bls monetary base is also Bls inflation-
cum- growth tax base, and with Bls monetary growth determined elsewhere, 
her revenues from money creation will fall. Hence Bls legislated 
deficit, too, will decline. 
Stability 
The equilibria just investigated are locally stable, given the 
assumed bounds on parameter values. 
Consider first the case of a flexible exchange rate. Focus 
on the subsystem describing country A, namely, (4.25a)I, (4.26a)I, 
and (4.27a)I . (Entirely symmetrical arguments apply to B.) The equa-
tions under consideration are easily reduced to the following first-
order equation in terms of c . . 
a 
t3 k 
a [ -a 6 c • . £n{2)] (4.40a)' c = + a 1 
- a t3 a a a c 
a a a 
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Upon linearizing in the neighbourhood of equilibrium we obtain the 
following eigenvalue, denoted by -A for future reference: 
. a 
* f3 (1 - ex ~ ) 
a a a 
1 - ex f3 
a a 
A- - -A-
a 
• (4 .41a) • 
From Figure 2, and given the Cagan condition ex f3 < 1, we 
a a 
see that the equilibrium PA is locally stable, whereas the equilibrium 
QA is locally unstable. 
Consider next the case whereby Country B pegs the exchange 
rate as well as its legislated deficit. Take (4.25b)', (4.27b)' 
and (4.28), set € = 0 and 0b = 0b' and use (4.25a)' and (4.40a)' 
to eliminate Pb(=Pa) and c
a 
respectively, to obtain two equations 
cb - f3 a k . 
= ° - [-ex ° .In(~)]}, cb -{a - + c b c a 1-ex f3 a a a c a a a a 
(4.42)' 
(4.43 ). 
f3b f3 a k . [0 [-ex 0 + In (.:...i!.) ] - c (Db + n) }. Db -- c 1 -ex f3 • c a a a a ca . a a a a 
These two equations, together with (4.41a)', define a third-order 
system in terms of ca ' cb ' and Db. Linearize in the neighbourhood 
of equilibrium, and recall (4.40a), to obtain the characteristic 
polynomial 
-A- - A- 0 0 a 
...I. .)~ 
* * 
,.. ,... 
-A - ~ cblc -~ - A- 0 a a a a 
"k .)~ .)~ ,... ,... f3b (A- I c - ~ Icb ) 0 -f3 - A-a a b , 
which yields the simple characteristic equation 
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The necessary and sufficient conditions for_ local stability 
are threefold. First, the reserve-currency country A must be stable 
in isolation--or, equivalently, it must be stable under floating rates. 
Second, A must maintain a positive rate of nominal money creation--or, 
equivalently, a positive legislated deficit. This is because the world 
rate of inflation tax functions as an automatic stabilizer in restor-
ing budget balance, in close analogy to the factor-income tax in 
Christ (1968) and the literature building on that paper; see Chapter I. 
Third, to ensure the eventual convergence of anticipated and actual 
inflation rates in the rest of the world, the speed of expectations 
adjustment must be positive in B. From Figure 3, we see that 
the equilibrium (PA,P
B
) is consistent with these conditions. 
Consider finally the case of fixed exchange rates and ' a pegged 
reserve ratio in country B. Now it suffices to restrict attention to 
the dynamic equations (4 Ala) , and (4.43)'. From the above character-
istic polynomial it is easy to deduce this systemts eigenvalues, 
namely, -A
a 
and - ~b. These require no further discussion. 
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This chapter has extended the analysis to the case of a multi-
country global econornyo In contrast to the preceding chapters, atten-
tion was focused almost exclusively on the ibudgetaryt characteriza-
tion of public policy. On the other hand, somewhat more attention 
was devoted to disaggregating time horizons. Thus, Section 1 con-
sidered the case of predetermined inflation expectations, and also 
(briefly) the case of predetermined output. Section 2 went to the 
longer-run case of perfect myopic foresight and fixed output 0 At the 
same time, the time horizon there was postulated to be sufficiently 
short to permit nominal rate of interest to be pegged, and quasi equi-
libria to occur, .i.e., sustained borrowing and lending between national 
public sectors. Section 3 envisaged a yet longer time horizon in 
which rates of interest always conform to the golden rule, and public 
policies ensure that sustained borrowing and lending between nation-
al public sectors does not take place. 7 
As in preceding chapters, the longer-run findings are more 
novel than those pertaining to the short run, so we restrict 
attention to Sections 2 and 3. In both sections, and in contrast 
to most of the analysis in preceding chapters, we went to the 
limiting case of perfect goods-market integration. 
Section 2 investigated steady-state interactions between in-
flations, budget deficits and trade deficits. In fact this !steady 
statet turned out to be at best neutrally stable. Hence our use of 
the term 'quasi equilibrium! (coined by Mundell (1968~. The following 
three results from that analysis hold irrespective of whether the 
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accompanying exchange-rate regime consists of fixed- or freely-
floating exchange rates. On the other hand, they do presuppose a 
mild inflation in the initial state: 
10 In each country, steady-state private disposable income 
is given by home output, plus the home trade deficit, 
minus home public spending 0 Hence global steady-state 
private disposable income will decline one-to-one with 
any increase in global public spending, but is invariant 
with respect to any change in global net explicit taxes 0 
2. A unit increase in the global legislated deficit will 
raise the steady-state rate of inflation in each country 
by the inverse of the global stock of aggregate public 
debt. 
3. A unit increase in the global legislated deficit will 
worsen the trade balance of each country by the home 
public sector's share in global increases in legislated 
deficits, minus the home private sectorts share in 
global aggregate public debto 
Section 3 adapted and extended the Cagan-Bailey inflation 
model to the case of pegged legislated deficits and a tHo-country 
global economy. As in Section 2, steady states were the main objects 
of interesto The term ufull equilibrium" was appropriate, since any 
equilibria between zero and revenue-maximizing rates of inflation 
turned out to be stable, given the well-known Cagan condition on 
the product of money-demand and expectational parameterso 
the following implications of that framework: 
Note 
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1. Once inflations and monetary growth are allowed to proceed 
at any positive rate short of revenue maximization, there 
are no simple links between public spending, net explicit 
taxes and steady-state private disposable income, since 
the deadweight losses associated with inflationary finance 
are not necessarily of second-order magnitude. 
2. Under fixed exchange rates, rates of monetary growth and 
inflation are equalized internationally. A 1 percent in-
crease in the legislated deficit of the reserve-currency 
country will induce a more than proportional rise In 
the steady-state global rates of monetary growth, and global 
inflation will rise. A 1 percent increase in the legislated 
deficit of the rest of the world, by contrast, will merely 
raise the domestic source component of its monetary base by 
1 percent, thereby reducing global international reserves; 
global inflation will not be affected. 
3. Under flexible exchange rates, an increase in the legislated 
deficit of any given country will raise the steady-state 
rates of monetary growth and inflation in that country only. 
The extent to which these local rates will rise is entirely 
analagous to that enunciated in the preceding proposition. 
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4. Under either fixed or flexible rates, public sectors 
have fewer degrees of freedom than might be supposed. 
Specifically, under fixed exchange rates, the rest of 
the world's public sector cannot peg both its legis-
lated deficit and the proportional reserve backing of 
its monetary base. And under flexible rates, no national 
public sector can peg both its legislated deficit and the 
rate of growth of its monetized debt. It follows that a 
constant monetary growth rule must be accompanied by an 
accommodating fiscal policy. 
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Notes to Chapter I 
1 Po Ill, loc. cit. Parkin terms this scenario the 'monetary-
pull' viewo See Brunner (1976) for a similar argument (albeit in the 
absence of interest-bearing public debt, and in the presence of the 
two countries rather than one). 
2 Noteworthy recent examples in the context of a closed economy 
include Blinder and Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976), Pyle and 
Turnovsky (1976), Dornbusch (1977) and Christ (1978). 
3 When an equation has both a nominal and a real per capita form, 
we shall denote the latter by a prime. Its nominal counterpart is set 
out only if it is of independent interest. 
40ur derivation uses the propositions dq/d~ == 0 and q == 1. 
o 
Also, the stated interpretation of (1.9c)' and (1.9d)f presupposes a 
positive marginal propensity to consume (s < 1), which, in turn, is 
intimately related to stability; see Section 5. 
5 6 
, These interpretations, of (1.12a) f and (lo14c)' respectively, 
are useful from the point of view of comparison with the relevant 
Christ results; see Section 4 above. In some contexts, however, it is 
more useful to think in terms of their dimensionless counterparts; see 
especially Section 4 of Chapter IV. In symbols we have 
dO/ O 
== 
D" ~ <, do*/o* 
== 1 - cxr* • 
dn* /n* 
== 
n*W*' 
The interpretation of such expressions is given in Chapter IV. 
l~2 
Notes to Chapter II 
lHawever W is not predetermined in the event of a change in 
the domestic parity; see Section 3 below for details. 
2To obtain (~/L)* = p + n, for example, observe that 
w 
£*= kq¢ exp(- or ), whence t* = o. F w 
30ur subsequent analysis focuses on the case p = r -p = n, 
w w w 
i.e., the foreign interest rate conforms to the golden rule. Of 
course that assumption is implied by (2.6c)' together with (2.llb)'. 
Notes to Chapter III 
lThe first four sections of this paper .are based on Turnovsky 
Kingston (1977), and especially Kingston and Turnovsky (1978). 
Section 5 builds on Clarke and Kingston (forthcoming). 
2In addition, neither of these articles actually sets out a 
price equation. But they have usually been interpreted as having some-
thing to say about "inflationary pressure". Moreover, subsequent 
studies in the Fleming-Mundell framework have explicitly included a 
"naive" Phillips curve in which the exogenous or predetermined nature 
of inflation expectations is either implicit, as in Takayama (1969), 
Helliwell (1969), or explicit, as in Turnovsky and Kaspura (1974). 
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3The first pair of equations follows directly from (3010)' 
and the definition 5 - g - t. The second pair follows from the 
first pair, tog~ther with (3.4e)' and (304f)'o The third pair 
follows from the other two pairs, together with (30lc)' and the 
initial conditions x 
o 
= 0 , ~ 
o 
= 1. 
4The first row of equalities follows directly from (3012)'0 
The second row follows from the first row, together with (3.4e)V and 
(3.4f)'. The third row follows from the other two rows, together 
with (30l2b)' and the initial condition ~ = 10 
o 
5Apart from our brief mention of the stability implications 
of TI = ~ (see Chapter I), and our treatment of the short-run effects 
of devaluation (see Chapter I~, hitherto in this dissertation we 
have assumed that expectations are conditioned on the actual past 
and present state of the system rather than the anticipated future 
state of exogenous variables. 
Notes to Chapter IV 
10f course nominal monetary growth in each country will rise 
pari passu. 
2To derive these equations note especially (4.10) above. 
3 See, too, Brunner (1976) for an extension of Christ's model 
to the fixed-rates two-country case. His model proceeds in terms of 
price levels (rather than inflation rates), abstracts from capital 
markets, deals with the case of partial rather than full goods-market 
integration, and yields a quasi equilibrium in the form of non-
stationary reserves rather than non-stationary net foreign borrowing. 
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4 Each of these equations employs the operations imrn€diately 
preceding (4013)'; (4.21)' uses (4018)'; (4.22)f uses (4.15)', (4019)', 
the definition of y. and the assumption q. = q.; and (4.23)' uses 
~ ~ ~ 
L x. - O. 
~ 
5 See Cagan (1956) and Bailey (1956). 
6Th , d' 1 b 1 t d . b' l' t ~s over eter~nacy resu t may e re a e to an ~nsta ~ ~ y 
resulted reported--but not interpreted--by Christ (1978), Turnovsky 
and Kingston (1977), and Marxsen (1978). Specifically, a Keynesian 
closed economy model, augmented by relationships for the government 
budget constraint and price adjustment under static inflation expectations 
(see Christ (1978), and the brief mention of its extension to adaptive 
expectations, in Chapter I above), such a model under flexible exchange 
rates and adaptive inflation expectations (see Turnovsky and Kingston 
(1977»,or a popular money-in-growth model (cf. Marxsen), will all exhibit 
instability if all of the following are pegged: real intensive govern-
ment spending; the rate of tax on real intensive factor incomes, regard-
less of whether that rate is specified in lump-sum or proportional terms; 
and the monetary growth rate. 
7It is worth pointing out that the policy assumption utilized 
to rule out quasi equilibrium, namely, that each national public sector 
pegs its outstanding real per capita stock of interest-bearing debt, is 
not as restrictive as might be supposed. For the steady-state equations 
we worked with in Section 3 would be yielded by any public policy which 
ensured full equilibrium under the international environment assumed 
there, the critical assumptions being equalized growth ra~es, and 
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zero international mobility of labour and money stocks. Thus, 
the steady-state results of Section 4 hold under imperfect goods 
mobility, i.e., relative purchasing pawer parity; and/or zero 
capital mobility, ioe., no interest arbitrage internationally. 
Note, too, that the extension to an arbitrary number of countries 
is straightforward. 
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